A Short Solution to the Many-Player Silent Duel with Arbitrary Consolation Prize

TL;DR

This paper provides a comprehensive and simplified solution to the many-player silent duel game with arbitrary consolation prizes, extending previous results and encompassing various special cases in the literature.

Contribution

It offers the first complete solution to the multi-player silent duel game with arbitrary consolation prizes, simplifying existing proofs and unifying various special cases.

Findings

Derived explicit equilibrium strategies for the game.

Unified multiple special cases within a single framework.

Simplified the proof compared to previous approaches.

Abstract

The classical constant-sum 'silent duel' game had two antagonistic marksmen walking towards each other. A more friendly formulation has two equally skilled marksmen approaching targets at which they may silently fire at distances of their own choice. The winner, who gets a unit prize, is the marksman who hits his target at the greatest distance; if both miss, they share the prize (each gets a 'consolation prize' of one half). In another formulation, if they both miss they each get zero. More generally we can consider more than two marksmen and an arbitrary consolation prize. This non-constant sum game may be interpreted as a research tournament where the entrant who successfully solves the hardest problem wins the prize. We give the first complete solution to the many-player problem with arbitrary consolation prize: moreover (by taking particular values for the consolation prize), our theorem incorporates various special results in the literature, and our proof is simpler than any of these.