TL;DR
This paper introduces a lightweight, verifiable monitoring extension for Certificate Transparency logs that allows users to independently verify notifications about certificates, enhancing trust without requiring continuous log inspection.
Contribution
The paper proposes a novel CT/bis extension enabling verifiable, lightweight monitoring of logs, supporting wildcard domains and integrating with existing gossip-audit security models.
Findings
Enables users to verify certificate notifications independently.
Supports monitoring of wildcard domains.
Integrates seamlessly with existing CT gossip-audit models.
Abstract
Trust in publicly verifiable Certificate Transparency (CT) logs is reduced through cryptography, gossip, auditing, and monitoring. The role of a monitor is to observe each and every log entry, looking for suspicious certificates that interest the entity running the monitor. While anyone can run a monitor, it requires continuous operation and copies of the logs to be inspected. This has lead to the emergence of monitoring-as-a-service: a trusted party runs the monitor and provides registered subjects with selective certificate notifications, e.g., "notify me of all foo.com certificates". We present a CT/bis extension for verifiable light-weight monitoring that enables subjects to verify the correctness of such notifications, reducing the trust that is placed in these monitors. Our extension supports verifiable monitoring of wild-card domains and piggybacks on CT's existing gossip-audit…
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