The nature of representation in Feynman diagrams
Mauro Dorato, Emanuele Rossanese

TL;DR
This paper critically examines the interpretative role of Feynman diagrams in quantum field theory, proposing a non-representational, inferential view aligned with Hughes' DDI theory, emphasizing their function as social, inferential tools rather than literal pictures.
Contribution
It introduces a novel interpretative framework for Feynman diagrams based on Hughes' DDI theory, challenging the traditional view of them as physical process depictions.
Findings
Feynman diagrams are better understood as inferential models.
They are social constructs used by physicists in reasoning.
This interpretation clarifies their role in quantum theories.
Abstract
After a brief presentation of Feynman diagrams, we criticizise the idea that Feynman diagrams can be considered to be pictures or depictions of actual physical processes. We then show that the best interpretation of the role they play in quantum field theory and quantum electrodynamics is captured by Hughes' Denotation, Deduction and Interpretation theory of models (DDI), where models are to be interpreted as inferential, non-representational devices constructed in given social contexts by the community of physicists.
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