The perverse incentive for insurance instruments that are derivatives: solving the jackpot problem with a clawback lien for default insurance notes
Brian P. Hanley

TL;DR
This paper identifies a perverse incentive problem in derivative-based insurance notes, like CDS, and proposes a clawback lien mechanism to align incentives and improve venture banking outcomes.
Contribution
It introduces a novel clawback lien solution to eliminate perverse incentives in default insurance notes, enhancing the effectiveness of venture capital insurance systems.
Findings
The perverse incentive reduces venture bank profitability in good investment scenarios.
Implementing a clawback lien aligns incentives and mitigates moral hazard.
The proposed mechanism improves the overall functioning of default insurance notes.
Abstract
When an insurance note is also a derivative a serious problem arises because a derivative must be fulfilled immediately. This feature of derivatives prevents claims processing procedures that screen out ineligible claims. This, in turn, creates a perverse incentive for insured holders of notes to commit acts that result in payment. This problem first surfaced with CDS contracts, which are part of a class of loan insurance I term a default insurance note. Without an address to this problem, within the average range of returns for a large venture capital portfolio, a venture-bank makes less money the better their investments do, in a continuous function. The highest rate of return is a total loss, 64% more than a top portfolio. Here, a strategy for removing this perverse incentive is defined, consisting of a clawback lien that returns part of the payment value as a lien on the firm…
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Taxonomy
TopicsInsurance and Financial Risk Management · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency · Credit Risk and Financial Regulations
