Cheater-altruist synergy in immunopathogenic ecological public goods games

TL;DR

This paper explores how, in certain ecological public goods scenarios involving pathogens and immune responses, cheaters can unexpectedly benefit the population by aiding in overcoming immune defenses, revealing a potential synergy between cheaters and cooperators.

Contribution

It introduces models showing that cheaters can enhance population survival against immune systems, highlighting a novel cooperative-cheating synergy in ecological public goods games.

Findings

Cheaters can help defeat immune responses under specific conditions.

Polymorphism of cheaters and altruists optimizes growth.

Synergy between cheaters and cooperators can be beneficial.

Abstract

Much research has focused on the deleterious effects of free-riding in public goods games, and a variety of mechanisms that suppresses cheating behaviour. Here we argue that under certain conditions cheating behaviour can be beneficial to the population. In a public goods game, cheaters do not pay for the cost of the public goods, yet they receive the benefit. Although this free-riding harms the entire population in the long run, the success of cheaters may aid the population when there is a common enemy that antagonizes both cooperators and cheaters. Here we study models in which an immune system antagonizes a cooperating pathogen. We investigate three population dynamics models, and determine under what conditions the presence of cheaters help defeat the immune system. The mechanism of action is that a polymorphism of cheaters and altruists optimizes the average growth rate. Our results give support for a possible synergy between cooperators and cheaters in ecological public goods games.