Attacking the Madry Defense Model with $L_1$-based Adversarial Examples
Yash Sharma, Pin-Yu Chen

TL;DR
This paper shows that relaxing $L_ ext{infty}$ constraints enables the EAD attack to produce transferable adversarial examples with minimal visual distortion, challenging the adequacy of $L_ ext{infty}$ as a distortion measure.
Contribution
It introduces the effectiveness of the elastic-net attack (EAD) under relaxed $L_ ext{infty}$ constraints, highlighting its ability to generate visually minimal yet transferable adversarial examples.
Findings
EAD can generate transferable adversarial examples with high $L_ ext{infty}$ distortion.
Relaxing $L_ ext{infty}$ constraints reveals limitations of using $L_ ext{infty}$ as sole distortion metric.
EAD demonstrates robustness in creating adversarial examples despite high average $L_ ext{infty}$ distortions.
Abstract
The Madry Lab recently hosted a competition designed to test the robustness of their adversarially trained MNIST model. Attacks were constrained to perturb each pixel of the input image by a scaled maximal distortion = 0.3. This discourages the use of attacks which are not optimized on the distortion metric. Our experimental results demonstrate that by relaxing the constraint of the competition, the elastic-net attack to deep neural networks (EAD) can generate transferable adversarial examples which, despite their high average distortion, have minimal visual distortion. These results call into question the use of as a sole measure for visual distortion, and further demonstrate the power of EAD at generating robust adversarial examples.
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Taxonomy
TopicsAdversarial Robustness in Machine Learning · Advanced Malware Detection Techniques · Network Security and Intrusion Detection
