Reality-Aware Social Choice
Ehud Shapiro, Nimrod Talmon

TL;DR
This paper introduces Reality-Aware Social Choice, a new framework that explicitly incorporates the default social state into voting and ranking processes, enabling more consistent and cycle-breaking decision rules.
Contribution
It develops a comprehensive theory of Reality-Aware Social Choice, including axioms, voting rules, and applications, filling a gap in traditional social choice models.
Findings
Reality can break Condorcet cycles effectively.
New Reality-aware voting rules satisfy specific axioms.
The framework has practical applications in decision-making processes.
Abstract
Social Choice theory generalizes voting on one proposal to ranking multiple proposals. Yet, while a vote on a single proposal has the status quo (Reality) as a default, Reality has been forsaken during this generalization. Here, we propose to restore this default social state and to incorporate Reality explicitly into Social Choice. We show that doing so gives rise to a new theory, complete with its domain restrictions, voting rules with their Reality-aware axiomatic properties, and certain game-theoretic aspects. In particular, we show how Reality can be used in a principled way to break Condorcet cycles and develop an efficient Reality-aware Condorcet-consistent agenda. We then discuss several applications of Reality-Aware Social Choice.
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Auction Theory and Applications
