Evolutionary games under incompetence
Maria Kleshnina, Jerzy A. Filar, Vladimir Ejov, and Jody C. McKerral

TL;DR
This paper explores how incompetence affects evolutionary game dynamics, showing that it can significantly alter species behavior and adaptation outcomes in natural systems.
Contribution
It introduces an incompetence parameter into replicator dynamics, revealing its impact on evolutionary outcomes and behavior in social species.
Findings
Incompetence can change the stable strategies in evolutionary games.
Incompetence influences the speed and direction of adaptation.
The model demonstrates the importance of learning imperfections in natural selection.
Abstract
The adaptation process of a species to a new environment is a significant area of study in biology. As part of natural selection, adaptation is a mutation process which improves survival skills and reproductive functions of species. Here, we investigate this process by combining the idea of incompetence with evolutionary game theory. In the sense of evolution, incompetence and training can be interpreted as a special learning process. With focus on the social side of the problem, we analyze the influence of incompetence on behavior of species. We introduce an incompetence parameter into a learning function in a single-population game and analyze its effect on the outcome of the replicator dynamics. Incompetence can change the outcome of the game and its dynamics, indicating its significance within what are inherently imperfect natural systems.
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