Tails & Tor and other tools for Safeguarding Online Activities
Stephanie Abraham, Tyler Silva, Robert Decourcy, Jim Cardon

TL;DR
This paper investigates tools like Tails and Tor for enhancing online activity security, discussing their vulnerabilities and methods to safeguard user anonymity and privacy online.
Contribution
It provides an analysis of existing tools for online safeguarding, highlighting potential vulnerabilities and discussing methods to improve user anonymity.
Findings
Controlling entrance and exit nodes can compromise user anonymity.
Tor has been successfully broken by advanced methods.
SSL encryption is crucial for protecting data on onion sites.
Abstract
There are not many known ways to break Tor anonymity, and they require an enormous amount of computational power. Controlling both entrance and exit nodes allows an attacker to compromise client IP with enough pattern analysis. If an .onion or public website does not use SSL, information will not be encrypted once it reaches the exit node. Tor has been successfully broken by Carnegie Mellon, however they will not answer questions nor confirm their method. This research paper investigates Tails & Tor and other tools for Safeguarding Online Activities.
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Taxonomy
TopicsInternet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting · Digital and Cyber Forensics · Cybercrime and Law Enforcement Studies
