A Distributed, Dynamical System View of Finite, Static Games

TL;DR

This paper presents a novel framework that models finite, static games as distributed dynamical systems driven by agents' payoff-based deviations, enabling new analysis and applications in game theory.

Contribution

It generalizes a previous method to all finite, static games, providing deviation rules and discussing potential applications.

Findings

Framework successfully models finite, static games as dynamical systems

Two deviation rules are introduced for agents' strategy updates

Potential applications in analyzing strategic interactions are discussed

Abstract

This paper contains a reformulation of any $n$-player finite, static game into a framework of distributed, dynamical system based on agents' payoff-based deviations. The reformulation generalizes the method employed in the second part of the study of countries' relation formation problem in Li and Morse (2017) to the case of any finite, static game. In the paper two deviation rules are provided and possible applications of this framework are discussed.