SpaceTEE: Secure and Tamper-Proof Computing in Space using CubeSats
Yan Michalevsky, Yonatan Winetraub

TL;DR
This paper introduces SpaceTEE, a novel approach using CubeSats in space as tamper-proof platforms for secure computation, addressing hardware trust issues in sensitive data processing.
Contribution
It presents a practical implementation of space-based trusted execution environments using low-cost CubeSats and designs a hardware security module as a root-of-trust.
Findings
Feasibility of using CubeSats for secure computation
Design of SpaceHSM for hardware security in space
Potential applications for space-based trusted platforms
Abstract
Sensitive computation often has to be performed in a trusted execution environment (TEE), which, in turn, requires tamper-proof hardware. If the computational fabric can be tampered with, we may no longer be able to trust the correctness of the computation. We study the idea of using computational platforms in space as a means to protect data from adversarial physical access. In this paper, we propose SpaceTEE - a practical implementation of this approach using low-cost nano-satellites called CubeSats. We study the constraints of such a platform, the cost of deployment, and discuss possible applications under those constraints. As a case study, we design a hardware security module solution (called SpaceHSM) and describe how it can be used to implement a root-of-trust for a certi cate authority (CA).
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Taxonomy
TopicsCryptographic Implementations and Security · Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security · Security and Verification in Computing
