Selfish Attacks in Two-hop IEEE 802.11 Relay Networks: Impact and Countermeasures

TL;DR

This paper investigates selfish MAC-layer attacks in two-hop IEEE 802.11 relay networks, analyzing their impact and proposing countermeasures to enhance network security against such vulnerabilities.

Contribution

It introduces the concept of selfish attacks specific to two-hop relay topologies, quantifies their effects, and evaluates potential defense strategies.

Findings

Selfish relay attacks can significantly degrade network performance.

Detection of selfish attacks remains complex due to secure routing protocols.

Countermeasures can mitigate the impact of selfish relay attacks.

Abstract

In IEEE 802.11 networks, selfish stations can pursue a better quality of service (QoS) through selfish MAC-layer attacks. Such attacks are easy to perform, secure routing protocols do not prevent them, and their detection may be complex. Two-hop relay topologies allow a new angle of attack: a selfish relay can tamper with either source traffic, transit traffic, or both. We consider the applicability of selfish attacks and their variants in the two-hop relay topology, quantify their impact, and study defense measures.