Nuclear Disarmament Verification via Resonant Phenomena
Jake J. Hecla, Areg Danagoulian

TL;DR
This paper introduces a novel nuclear verification method using isotope-specific resonance phenomena, enabling secure, zero-knowledge authentication of nuclear warheads to enhance disarmament treaty trustworthiness.
Contribution
It proposes a new physical zero-knowledge proof system based on nuclear resonance, providing secure verification without revealing sensitive information.
Findings
System can authenticate warheads without revealing isotopic data
Monte Carlo simulations confirm detection of hoaxing attempts
Method enhances trust and reach of nuclear disarmament treaties
Abstract
Nuclear disarmament treaties are not sufficient in and of themselves to neutralize the existential threat of the nuclear weapons. Technologies are necessary for verifying the authenticity of the nuclear warheads undergoing dismantlement before counting them towards a treaty partner's obligation. This work presents a novel concept that leverages isotope-specific nuclear resonance phenomena to authenticate a warhead's fissile components by comparing them to a previously authenticated template. All information is encrypted in the physical domain in a manner that amounts to a physical zero-knowledge proof system. Using Monte Carlo simulations, the system is shown to reveal no isotopic or geometric information about the weapon, while readily detecting hoaxing attempts. This nuclear technique can dramatically increase the reach and trustworthiness of future nuclear disarmament treaties.
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
