Detecting Censor Detection

TL;DR

This study empirically investigates how different countries' censors respond to new proxy servers, especially obfuscated Tor bridges, revealing delays, failures, and evolving blocking techniques over a year of active measurements.

Contribution

It provides the first long-term empirical analysis of censor reactions to new proxy deployment, highlighting unexpected behaviors and evolving censorship strategies.

Findings

Censors exhibit long and variable delays before blocking bridges.

Frequent failures occur where blocked bridges temporarily become reachable.

Censors adapt their blocking techniques over time, complicating circumvention efforts.

Abstract

Our goal is to empirically discover how censors react to the introduction of new proxy servers that can be used to circumvent their information controls. We examine a specific case, that of obfuscated Tor bridges, and conduct experiments designed to discover how long it takes censors to block them (if they do block at all). Through a year's worth of active measurements from China, Iran, Kazakhstan, and other countries, we learn when bridges become blocked. In China we found the most interesting behavior, including long and varying delays before blocking, frequent failures during which blocked bridges became reachable, and an advancement in blocking technique midway through the experiment. Throughout, we observed surprising behavior by censors, not in accordance with what we would have predicted, calling into question our assumptions and suggesting potential untapped avenues for circumvention.