Statistical Watermarking for Networked Control Systems
Pedro Hespanhol, Matthew Porter, Ram Vasudevan, Anil Aswani

TL;DR
This paper develops a statistical watermarking method for networked control systems that detects sensor and communication attacks, ensuring stability and attack detection in decentralized settings.
Contribution
It introduces a new watermarking test tailored for networked systems with subcontrollers, addressing communication attacks and controller design challenges.
Findings
Successfully detects sensor and communication attacks in simulations.
Ensures closed-loop stability with decentralized controllers.
Provides two controller design approaches using Heymann's lemma.
Abstract
Watermarking can detect sensor attacks in control systems by injecting a private signal into the control, whereby attacks are identified by checking the statistics of the sensor measurements and private signal. However, past approaches assume full state measurements or a centralized controller, which is not found in networked LTI systems with subcontrollers. Since generally the entire system is neither controllable nor observable by a single subcontroller, communication of sensor measurements is required to ensure closed-loop stability. The possibility of attacking the communication channel has not been explicitly considered by previous watermarking schemes, and requires a new design. In this paper, we derive a statistical watermarking test that can detect both sensor and communication attacks. A unique (compared to the non-networked case) aspect of the implementing this test is the…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
