Strategy intervention for the evolution of fairness
Yanling Zhang, Feng Fu

TL;DR
This paper introduces a new evolutionary model incorporating high offers and non-monotonic rejections to study how spite influences fairness evolution, revealing that spite promotes fairness while altruism inhibits it.
Contribution
It explicitly models high-offer rejections and strategy intervention, providing analytical insights into the effects of population structure, mutation, and migration on fairness evolution.
Findings
Spite promotes fairness in structured populations.
Altruism inhibits fairness and is maximized at intermediate mutation rates.
Migration inhibits selfishness and fairness, but promotes altruism and spite.
Abstract
Masses of experiments have shown individual preference for fairness which seems irrational. The reason behind it remains a focus for research. The effect of spite (individuals are only concerned with their own relative standing) on the evolution of fairness has attracted increasing attention from experiments, but only has been implicitly studied in one evolutionary model. The model did not involve high-offer rejections, which have been found in the form of non-monotonic rejections (rejecting offers that are too high or too low) in experiments. Here, we introduce a high offer and a non-monotonic rejection in structured populations of finite size, and use strategy intervention to explicitly study how spite influences the evolution of fairness: five strategies are in sequence added into the competition of a fair strategy and a selfish strategy. We find that spite promotes fairness,…
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