On Finding Equilibrium Stopping Times for Time-Inconsistent Markovian Problems
S\"oren Christensen, Kristoffer Lindensj\"o

TL;DR
This paper develops a method to find equilibrium stopping times in time-inconsistent Markovian problems, where traditional optimal stopping concepts do not apply, by adapting consistent planning and variational inequalities.
Contribution
It introduces a new equilibrium concept for time-inconsistent problems, along with an iterative approach and verification theorem for finding equilibrium stopping times.
Findings
Developed an iterative method for equilibrium stopping times.
Proved a verification theorem using variational inequalities.
Applied the theory to a selling strategy problem with utility and habit formation.
Abstract
Standard Markovian optimal stopping problems are consistent in the sense that the first entrance time into the stopping set is optimal for each initial state of the process. Clearly, the usual concept of optimality cannot in a straightforward way be applied to non-standard stopping problems without this time-consistent structure. This paper is devoted to the solution of time-inconsistent stopping problems with the reward depending on the initial state using an adaptation of Strotz's consistent planning. More precisely, we give a precise equilibrium definition --- of the type subgame perfect Nash equilibrium based on pure Markov strategies. In general, such equilibria do not always exist and if they exist they are in general not unique. We, however, develop an iterative approach to finding equilibrium stopping times for a general class of problems and apply this approach to one-sided…
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