Effects of updating rules on the coevolving prisoner's dilemma
Hirofumi Takesue

TL;DR
This study investigates how different strategy updating rules in coevolving prisoner's dilemma games influence the evolution of cooperation, highlighting the importance of imitation direction and partner switching.
Contribution
It compares three updating rules in coevolving networks, revealing how partner switching and imitation direction affect cooperation dynamics.
Findings
Partner switching supports cooperation under voter-model-like dynamics.
Cooperators often vanish under invasion-process-like dynamics.
Strong selection generally promotes cooperation, especially under certain updating rules.
Abstract
We studied the effect of three strategy updating rules in coevolving prisoner's dilemma games where agents (nodes) can switch both the strategy and social partners. Under two node-based strategy updating rules, strategy updating occurs between a randomly chosen focal node and its randomly selected neighbour. The focal agent becomes the strategy recipient and may imitate the strategy of the neighbour according to the payoff difference, i.e. voter-model-like dynamics (VMLD), or becomes a strategy donor and thus may be imitated by the neighbour, i.e. invasion-process-like dynamics (IPLD). For edge-based updating rules, one edge is selected, and the roles of the two connected nodes (donor or recipient) are randomly decided, i.e. edge-based dynamics (EBD). A computer simulation shows that partner switching supports the evolution of cooperation under VMLD, which has been utilised in many…
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