Evolution of Cooperation in Public Goods Games with Stochastic Opting-Out
Alexander G. Ginsberg, Feng Fu

TL;DR
This paper explores how stochastic opting-out influences cooperation in public goods games, revealing that higher non-participation probabilities can promote cooperation and affect evolutionary dynamics.
Contribution
It introduces a model incorporating fixed probabilities of opting-out, analyzing their impact on cooperation evolution and coevolution with opting-out behavior.
Findings
Higher opting-out probability facilitates cooperation under certain conditions.
Population tends towards defection and non-participation over time.
Increased non-participation slows the shift towards defection.
Abstract
This paper investigates the evolution of strategic play where players drawn from a finite well-mixed population are offered the opportunity to play in a public goods game. All players accept the offer. However, due to the possibility of unforeseen circumstances, each player has a fixed probability of being unable to participate in the game, unlike similar models which assume voluntary participation. We first study how prescribed stochastic opting-out affects cooperation in finite populations. Moreover, in the model, cooperation is favored by natural selection over both neutral drift and defection if return on investment exceeds a threshold value defined solely by the population size, game size, and a player's probability of opting-out. Ultimately, increasing the probability that each player is unable to fulfill her promise of participating in the public goods game facilitates natural…
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Taxonomy
TopicsEvolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Evolution and Genetic Dynamics
