A philosophical argument against time machines
Juliano C. S. Neves

TL;DR
This paper presents a philosophical critique of time machines, arguing they are modern myths rooted in ressentiment, and advocates for embracing the concept of amor fati as an alternative perspective.
Contribution
It introduces a novel philosophical argument against time machines using Nietzsche-Heraclitus and Simondon's ideas, emphasizing process and individuation.
Findings
Time machines are seen as modern fables influenced by ressentiment.
Philosophical frameworks challenge the feasibility of time travel.
Proposes amor fati as an alternative to the concept of time machines.
Abstract
Time machines are predictions of Einstein's theory of general relativity and provide a myriad of unsolved paradoxes. Convincing and general arguments against time machines and their paradoxes are missing in physics and philosophy so far. In this article, a philosophical argument against time machines is given. When thought of as a process, individuation refuses the idea of time machines, in particular travels into the past. With the aid of Nietzsche-Heraclitus' philosophy of becoming and Simondon's notion of process of individuation, I propose that time machines are modern fables, created by the man of . In the formula of Nietzsche, I suggest the antipode to time machines.
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Taxonomy
TopicsCosmology and Gravitation Theories · Philosophy and History of Science · Quantum Mechanics and Applications
