Analysis of Solar Energy Aggregation under Various Billing Mechanisms
Pratyush Chakraborty, Enrique Baeyens, Pramod P. Khargonekar,, Kameshwar Poolla, and Pravin Varaiya

TL;DR
This paper explores how community sharing of solar PV systems can reduce costs for households under different billing mechanisms, using game theory and real data analysis.
Contribution
It introduces cooperative game theory-based conditions and allocation rules for PV sharing, promoting cost savings and fair distribution among community members.
Findings
Sharing reduces net costs under certain billing mechanisms.
Net metering and net purchase/sale mechanisms favor sharing benefits.
Case study confirms cost savings with PV aggregation.
Abstract
Ongoing reductions in the cost of solar photovoltaic (PV) systems are driving their increased installations by residential households. Various incentive programs such as feed-in tariff, net metering, net purchase and sale that allow the prosumers to sell their generated electricity to the grid are also powering this trend. In this paper, we investigate sharing of PV systems among a community of households, who can also benefit further by pooling their production. Using cooperative game theory, we find conditions under which such sharing decreases their net total cost. We also develop allocation rules such that the joint net electricity consumption cost is allocated to the participants. These cost allocations are based on the cost causation principle. The allocations also satisfy the standalone cost principle and promote PV solar aggregation. We also perform a comparative analytical…
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