Assentication: User Deauthentication and Lunchtime Attack Mitigation with Seated Posture Biometric
Tyler Kaczmarek, Ercan Ozturk, and Gene Tsudik

TL;DR
This paper introduces PoPa, a seated posture biometric for continuous user authentication and deauthentication, effectively mitigating lunchtime attacks with high accuracy and low false rates.
Contribution
PoPa is a novel hybrid biometric based on seated posture, enabling unobtrusive, continuous deauthentication to prevent insider attacks in workplace settings.
Findings
PoPa achieves 91.0% average user identification accuracy.
PoPa exhibits very low false positive and false negative rates.
PoPa compares favorably with other biometric deauthentication methods.
Abstract
Biometric techniques are often used as an extra security factor in authenticating human users. Numerous biometrics have been proposed and evaluated, each with its own set of benefits and pitfalls. Static biometrics (such as fingerprints) are geared for discrete operation, to identify users, which typically involves some user burden. Meanwhile, behavioral biometrics (such as keystroke dynamics) are well suited for continuous, and sometimes more unobtrusive, operation. One important application domain for biometrics is deauthentication, a means of quickly detecting absence of a previously authenticated user and immediately terminating that user's active secure sessions. Deauthentication is crucial for mitigating so called Lunchtime Attacks, whereby an insider adversary takes over (before any inactivity timeout kicks in) authenticated state of a careless user who walks away from her…
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