The Countries' Relation Formation Problem: I and II

TL;DR

This paper develops a comprehensive framework for understanding how countries form relations, combining static and dynamic models, and extends previous work on countries' power allocation with new theoretical insights and applications.

Contribution

It introduces a unified framework for countries' relation formation, integrating static and dynamic models, and extends prior power allocation models with new theoretical results.

Findings

Existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the static game

Framework enables analysis of countries' relation dynamics

Applications include strategic alliance and conflict modeling

Abstract

This paper integrates the studies of various countries' behaviors, e.g., waging wars and entering into military alliances, into a general framework of \emph{countries' relation formation}, which consists of two components, i.e., a static game and a dynamical system. Aside from being a stand-alone framework itself, this paper can also be seen as a necessary extension of a recently developed \emph{countries' power allocation game} in \cite{allocation}. We establish certain theoretical results, such as pure strategy Nash equilibrium existence in the static game, and propose several applications of interest made possible by combining both frameworks of countries' power allocation and relation formation.