Composable security in relativistic quantum cryptography
V. Vilasini, Christopher Portmann, Lidia del Rio

TL;DR
This paper develops a new composable framework using Causal Boxes within Abstract Cryptography to analyze relativistic quantum cryptography protocols, enabling the derivation of novel security impossibility results.
Contribution
It introduces a Minkowski space-based, composable security framework for relativistic quantum cryptography, addressing limitations of previous models.
Findings
Coin flipping can be constructed from the primitive channel with delay
Biased coin flipping and bit commitment are impossible without additional assumptions
Channels with delay cannot be improved
Abstract
Relativistic protocols have been proposed to overcome some impossibility results in classical and quantum cryptography. In such a setting, one takes the location of honest players into account, and uses the fact that information cannot travel faster than the speed of light to limit the abilities of dishonest agents. For example, various relativistic bit commitment protocols have been proposed. Although it has been shown that bit commitment is sufficient to construct oblivious transfer and thus multiparty computation, composing specific relativistic protocols in this way is known to be insecure. A composable framework is required to perform such a modular security analysis of construction schemes, but no known frameworks can handle models of computation in Minkowski space. By instantiating the systems model from the Abstract Cryptography framework with Causal Boxes, we obtain such a…
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