Binary Voting with Delegable Proxy: An Analysis of Liquid Democracy
Zo\'e Christoff (University of Bayreuth), Davide Grossi (University of, Liverpool)

TL;DR
This paper analyzes liquid democracy, focusing on delegation cycles and rationality issues, and discusses potential modifications to improve the system's robustness and logical consistency.
Contribution
It positions liquid democracy within binary aggregation theory and examines key issues, proposing modifications to address delegation cycles and rationality concerns.
Findings
Delegation cycles can occur and impact decision-making.
Delegations can affect rationality when voting on interdependent propositions.
Proposed modifications aim to mitigate these issues.
Abstract
The paper provides an analysis of the voting method known as delegable proxy voting, or liquid democracy. The analysis first positions liquid democracy within the theory of binary aggregation. It then focuses on two issues of the system: the occurrence of delegation cycles; and the effect of delegations on individual rationality when voting on logically interdependent propositions. It finally points to proposals on how the system may be modified in order to address the above issues.
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