Hipsters on Networks: How a Small Group of Individuals Can Lead to an Anti-Establishment Majority

TL;DR

This paper models how a small group of anti-establishment individuals, called hipsters, can significantly influence the overall adoption of competing products in social networks, even when starting from minimal initial presence.

Contribution

It introduces a deterministic model of opinion spreading with hipsters that can cause a minority to dominate, supported by simulations and analytical approximations.

Findings

Small fraction of hipsters can reverse product popularity.

Time delay in information affects final adoption distribution.

Model applies to real and synthetic networks.

Abstract

The spread of opinions, memes, diseases, and "alternative facts" in a population depends both on the details of the spreading process and on the structure of the social and communication networks on which they spread. In this paper, we explore how \textit{anti-establishment} nodes (e.g., \textit{hipsters}) influence the spreading dynamics of two competing products. We consider a model in which spreading follows a deterministic rule for updating node states (which describe which product has been adopted) in which an adjustable fraction $p_{\rm Hip}$ of the nodes in a network are hipsters, who choose to adopt the product that they believe is the less popular of the two. The remaining nodes are conformists, who choose which product to adopt by considering which products their immediate neighbors have adopted. We simulate our model on both synthetic and real networks, and we show that the hipsters have a major effect on the final fraction of people who adopt each product: even when only one of the two products exists at the beginning of the simulations, a very small fraction of hipsters in a network can still cause the other product to eventually become the more popular one. To account for this behavior, we construct an approximation for the steady-state adoption fraction on $k$-regular trees in the limit of few hipsters. Additionally, our simulations demonstrate that a time delay $\tau$ in the knowledge of the product distribution in a population, as compared to immediate knowledge of product adoption among nearest neighbors, can have a large effect on the final distribution of product adoptions. Our simple model and analysis may help shed light on the road to success for anti-establishment choices in elections, as such success can arise rather generically in our model from a small number of anti-establishment individuals and ordinary processes of social influence on normal individuals.