A multi-agent reinforcement learning model of common-pool resource appropriation
Julien Perolat, Joel Z. Leibo, Vinicius Zambaldi, Charles Beattie,, Karl Tuyls, Thore Graepel

TL;DR
This paper demonstrates that deep reinforcement learning can model the emergent behaviors of autonomous agents managing common-pool resources, revealing insights into cooperation, sustainability, and inequality in complex social dilemmas.
Contribution
It introduces a multi-agent reinforcement learning framework for modeling common-pool resource appropriation, extending beyond traditional game theory to complex, real-time environments.
Findings
Learning dynamics influence resource sustainability
Exclusion impacts inequality among agents
Trial-and-error learning is crucial for cooperation
Abstract
Humanity faces numerous problems of common-pool resource appropriation. This class of multi-agent social dilemma includes the problems of ensuring sustainable use of fresh water, common fisheries, grazing pastures, and irrigation systems. Abstract models of common-pool resource appropriation based on non-cooperative game theory predict that self-interested agents will generally fail to find socially positive equilibria---a phenomenon called the tragedy of the commons. However, in reality, human societies are sometimes able to discover and implement stable cooperative solutions. Decades of behavioral game theory research have sought to uncover aspects of human behavior that make this possible. Most of that work was based on laboratory experiments where participants only make a single choice: how much to appropriate. Recognizing the importance of spatial and temporal resource dynamics, a…
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Taxonomy
TopicsExperimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Game Theory and Applications
