Multistage Voting Model with Alternative Elimination

TL;DR

This paper introduces a multistage voting model with alternative elimination, analyzing how agents vote and how thresholds influence the process, supported by simulations demonstrating key properties.

Contribution

It proposes a novel multistage voting framework with threshold updating and finite stopping, advancing understanding of dynamic voting processes.

Findings

Threshold updating affects elimination dynamics

Simulations show finite termination of voting games

Properties of voting stability and convergence

Abstract

The voting process is formalized as a multistage voting model with successive alternative elimination. A finite number of agents vote for one of the alternatives each round subject to their preferences. If the number of votes given to the alternative is less than a threshold, it gets eliminated from the game. A special subclass of repeated games that always stop after a finite number of stages is considered. Threshold updating rule is proposed. A computer simulation is used to illustrate two properties of these voting games.