Game Theory for Secure Critical Interdependent Gas-Power-Water Infrastructure
Aidin Ferdowsi, Anibal Sanjab, Walid Saad, Narayan B. Mandayam

TL;DR
This paper models the interdependent gas, water, and power infrastructure as a game between attackers and defenders, using game theory to optimize security strategies and reduce power generation costs under attack.
Contribution
It introduces a novel game-theoretic framework for analyzing security in interdependent infrastructure systems, providing insights into optimal resource allocation at equilibrium.
Findings
Expected power generation cost deviation is 35% lower at equilibrium.
Interdependence influences attacker and defender strategies.
Resource allocation to water and gas systems enhances grid protection.
Abstract
A city's critical infrastructure such as gas, water, and power systems, are largely interdependent since they share energy, computing, and communication resources. This, in turn, makes it challenging to endow them with fool-proof security solutions. In this paper, a unified model for interdependent gas-power-water infrastructure is presented and the security of this model is studied using a novel game-theoretic framework. In particular, a zero-sum noncooperative game is formulated between a malicious attacker who seeks to simultaneously alter the states of the gas-power-water critical infrastructure to increase the power generation cost and a defender who allocates communication resources over its attack detection filters in local areas to monitor the infrastructure. At the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of this game, numerical results show that the expected power generation cost…
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