Common Counterfactual Belief of Rationality Subsumes Superrationality On Symmetric Games

TL;DR

This paper demonstrates that in symmetric games, strategies deemed superrational are also rational under common counterfactual beliefs, unifying two concepts in game theory.

Contribution

It establishes that superrational strategies in symmetric games are encompassed by rationality criteria based on common counterfactual beliefs, linking two theoretical frameworks.

Findings

Superrational strategies satisfy minimax-rationalizability.

Superrational strategies satisfy individual rationality.

The unification applies specifically to symmetric games.

Abstract

This paper shows that, for symmetric games in normal form, strategy profiles that satisfy Hofstadter's Superrationality criterion also satisfy both of Halpern's and Pass's criteria under Common Counterfactual Belief of Rationality: minimax-rationalizability and individual rationality.