On random exchange-stable matchings
Boris Pittel

TL;DR
This paper analyzes the properties of exchange-stable matchings in bipartite and non-bipartite settings, providing asymptotic expectations, variance bounds, and probability estimates for the existence of such matchings.
Contribution
It establishes the asymptotic expected number of exchange-stable matchings and bounds their standard deviation, revealing the rarity of instances with many such matchings.
Findings
Expected number of e-stable matchings asymptotic to rac{\u221a{\u03c0 n}}{2} for two-sided case
Expected number of e-stable matchings asymptotic to e^{1/2} for one-sided case
Probability that no matching is both stable and e-stable is exponentially high
Abstract
Consider the group of men and women, each with their own preference list for a potential marriage partner. The stable marriage is a bipartite matching such that no unmatched pair (man, woman) prefer each other to their partners in the matching. Its non-bipartite version, with an even number of members, is known as the stable roommates problem. Jose Alcalde introduced an alternative notion of exchange-stable, one-sided, matching: no two members prefer each other's partners to their own partners in the matching. Katarina Cechl\'arov\'a and David Manlove showed that the e-stable matching decision problem is -complete for both types of matchings. We prove that the expected number of e-stable matchings is asymptotic to for two-sided case, and to for one-sided case. However, the standard deviation of this number exceeds ,…
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