Group Strategyproof Pareto-Stable Marriage with Indifferences via the Generalized Assignment Game

TL;DR

This paper introduces a mechanism for stable marriage with indifferences that ensures Pareto-stability and group strategyproofness for one side, using a generalized assignment game approach, and extends to college admissions.

Contribution

It presents a novel, efficient mechanism for Pareto-stable matchings with indifferences that is group strategyproof for one side, modeled via a generalized assignment game.

Findings

Mechanism achieves Pareto-stability with indifferences.

Mechanism is group strategyproof for one side.

Efficient implementation demonstrated.

Abstract

We study the variant of the stable marriage problem in which the preferences of the agents are allowed to include indifferences. We present a mechanism for producing Pareto-stable matchings in stable marriage markets with indifferences that is group strategyproof for one side of the market. Our key technique involves modeling the stable marriage market as a generalized assignment game. We also show that our mechanism can be implemented efficiently. These results can be extended to the college admissions problem with indifferences.