Path deviations outperform approximate stability in heterogeneous congestion games
Pieter Kleer, Guido Sch\"afer

TL;DR
This paper analyzes how path deviations affect the efficiency of equilibrium flows in heterogeneous congestion games, showing that deviations are less detrimental than approximate stability, with tight bounds established for various scenarios.
Contribution
It introduces a detailed analysis of path deviations in heterogeneous congestion games, providing tight bounds on inefficiency and highlighting differences from approximate stability.
Findings
Path deviations are less harmful than approximate stability in heterogeneous populations.
Tight bounds on inefficiency are derived for various types of congestion games.
A tight bound on the Price of Risk-Aversion for matroid congestion games is established.
Abstract
We consider non-atomic network congestion games with heterogeneous players where the latencies of the paths are subject to some bounded deviations. This model encompasses several well-studied extensions of the classical Wardrop model which incorporate, for example, risk-aversion, altruism or travel time delays. Our main goal is to analyze the worst-case deterioration in social cost of a perturbed Nash flow (i.e., for the perturbed latencies) with respect to an original Nash flow. We show that for homogeneous players perturbed Nash flows coincide with approximate Nash flows and derive tight bounds on their inefficiency. In contrast, we show that for heterogeneous populations this equivalence does not hold. We derive tight bounds on the inefficiency of both perturbed and approximate Nash flows for arbitrary player sensitivity distributions. Intuitively, our results suggest that the…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Applications · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Game Theory and Voting Systems
