Accumulation of individual fitness or wealth as a population game
Sylvain Gibaud, Jorgen W. Weibull

TL;DR
This paper models the accumulation of individual fitness or wealth as a population game, analyzing how resources, game dynamics, and wealth depreciation influence long-term distribution and average wealth, with implications for understanding the 'curse of riches.'
Contribution
It introduces a novel population game framework for wealth accumulation, including extensions where wealth influences winning probabilities, and provides analytical insights into wealth distribution dynamics.
Findings
Long-term average wealth is non-monotonic in resource value.
Wealth distribution and evolution are analytically characterized.
The model offers a potential explanation for the 'curse of riches' phenomenon.
Abstract
The accumulation of individual fitness or wealth is modelled as a population game in which pairs of individuals are recurrently and randomly matched to play a game over a resource. In addition, all individuals have random access to a constant background resource, and their fitness or wealth depreciates over time. For brevity we focus on the well-known Hawk-Dove game. In the base-line model, the probability of winning a fight (that is, when both play Hawk) is the same for both parties. In an extended version, the individual with higher current fitness or wealth has a higher probability of winning. Analytical results are given for the fitness/wealth distribution at any given time, for the evolution of average fitness/wealth over time, and for the asymptotics with respect to time and population size. Long-run average fitness/wealth is non-monotonic in the value of the resource, thus…
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Taxonomy
TopicsEvolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Complex Systems and Time Series Analysis · Evolution and Genetic Dynamics
