SafetyNets: Verifiable Execution of Deep Neural Networks on an Untrusted Cloud
Zahra Ghodsi, Tianyu Gu, Siddharth Garg

TL;DR
SafetyNets is a framework that allows clients to verify the correctness of deep neural network inferences performed by untrusted cloud servers through efficient cryptographic proofs, ensuring accuracy and trustworthiness.
Contribution
It introduces a novel verifiable computation protocol for deep neural networks represented as arithmetic circuits, enabling trust in outsourced inference tasks.
Findings
Low runtime costs for both client and server.
High probability of detecting incorrect computations.
Achieves state-of-the-art accuracy on MNIST and TIMIT tasks.
Abstract
Inference using deep neural networks is often outsourced to the cloud since it is a computationally demanding task. However, this raises a fundamental issue of trust. How can a client be sure that the cloud has performed inference correctly? A lazy cloud provider might use a simpler but less accurate model to reduce its own computational load, or worse, maliciously modify the inference results sent to the client. We propose SafetyNets, a framework that enables an untrusted server (the cloud) to provide a client with a short mathematical proof of the correctness of inference tasks that they perform on behalf of the client. Specifically, SafetyNets develops and implements a specialized interactive proof (IP) protocol for verifiable execution of a class of deep neural networks, i.e., those that can be represented as arithmetic circuits. Our empirical results on three- and four-layer deep…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAdversarial Robustness in Machine Learning · Cryptography and Data Security · Security and Verification in Computing
