On Optimal Group Claims at Voting in a Stochastic Environment
V.A. Malyshev, P.Yu. Chebotarev
TL;DR
This paper investigates how a strategic voting group can prevent society from falling into collectively undesirable states in a stochastic voting environment by regulating claim thresholds, with analytical insights into welfare impacts.
Contribution
It introduces a model where a voting group can influence societal outcomes by adjusting claim thresholds, addressing the 'pit of losses' paradox in social dynamics.
Findings
Group voting can mitigate the pit of losses paradox.
Optimal claim thresholds improve overall societal welfare.
Analytical formulas characterize welfare as a function of claim thresholds.
Abstract
There is a paradox in the model of social dynamics determined by voting in a stochastic environment (the ViSE model) called "pit of losses." It consists in the fact that a series of democratic decisions may systematically lead the society to the states unacceptable for all the voters. The paper examines how this paradox can be neutralized by the presence in society of a group that votes for its benefit and can regulate the threshold of its claims. We obtain and analyze analytical results characterizing the welfare of the whole society, the group, and the other participants as functions of the said claims threshold.
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78\TransIssueNo6\OrigIssueNo6\OrigPages157–172 \OrigCopyrightedAuthorsV.A. Malyshev, P.Yu. Chebotarev