This paper introduces a combinatorial framework for adversarial network coding, providing bounds on various capacities for point-to-point and multi-source networks, along with capacity-achieving schemes for certain adversarial models.
Contribution
It presents a novel method to extend capacity bounds from point-to-point channels to complex networks with adversaries, and describes coding schemes for specific adversarial scenarios.
Findings
01
Upper bounds on one-shot, zero-error, and compound zero-error capacities for channels.
02
General technique to transfer capacity bounds from point-to-point to networks.
03
Capacity-achieving codes for certain adversarial models.
Abstract
A combinatorial framework for adversarial network coding is presented. Channels are described by specifying the possible actions that one or more (possibly coordinated) adversaries may take. Upper bounds on three notions of capacity (the one-shot capacity, the zero-error capacity, and the compound zero-error capacity) are obtained for point-to-point channels, and generalized to corresponding capacity regions appropriate for multi-source networks. A key result of this paper is a general method by which bounds on these capacities in point-to-point channels may be ported to networks. This technique is illustrated in detail for Hamming-type channels with multiple adversaries operating on specific coordinates, which correspond, in the context of networks, to multiple adversaries acting on specific network edges. Capacity-achieving coding schemes are described for some of the considered…
Equations276
\textnormal{C}_{1}(\Omega):=\max\{\log_{2}|\mathcal{C}|:\mbox{$\mathcal{C}\subseteq\mathcal{X}$ is good
for $\Omega$}\}.
\textnormal{C}_{1}(\Omega):=\max\{\log_{2}|\mathcal{C}|:\mbox{$\mathcal{C}\subseteq\mathcal{X}$ is good
for $\Omega$}\}.
(\Omega_{1}\times\Omega_{2})(x_{1},x_{2}):=\Omega_{1}(x_{1})\times\Omega_{2}(x_{2}),\mbox{ for all
$(x_{1},x_{2})\in\mathcal{X}_{1}\times\mathcal{X}_{2}$}.
(\Omega_{1}\times\Omega_{2})(x_{1},x_{2}):=\Omega_{1}(x_{1})\times\Omega_{2}(x_{2}),\mbox{ for all
$(x_{1},x_{2})\in\mathcal{X}_{1}\times\mathcal{X}_{2}$}.
Ωn:=n timesΩ×⋯×Ω:Xn⇢Yn.
Ωn:=n timesΩ×⋯×Ω:Xn⇢Yn.
\alpha_{\Omega}(x,x^{\prime}):=\left\{\begin{array}[]{ll}1&\mbox{ if }\Omega(x)\cap\Omega(x^{\prime})\neq\emptyset,\\
0&\mbox{ otherwise.}\end{array}\right.
\alpha_{\Omega}(x,x^{\prime}):=\left\{\begin{array}[]{ll}1&\mbox{ if }\Omega(x)\cap\Omega(x^{\prime})\neq\emptyset,\\
0&\mbox{ otherwise.}\end{array}\right.
\textnormal{H}_{\bm{t},\bm{e}}\langle\bm{U}\rangle(x):=\left\{y\in\hat{\mathcal{A}}^{s}:y_{i}=x_{i}\mbox{ for }i\notin\bigcup_{\ell=1}^{L}U_{\ell},\,\delta(y,x;U_{\ell})\leq t_{\ell},\,\omega_{\star}(y;U_{\ell})\leq e_{\ell}\mbox{ for all $1\leq\ell\leq L$}\right\}.
\textnormal{H}_{\bm{t},\bm{e}}\langle\bm{U}\rangle(x):=\left\{y\in\hat{\mathcal{A}}^{s}:y_{i}=x_{i}\mbox{ for }i\notin\bigcup_{\ell=1}^{L}U_{\ell},\,\delta(y,x;U_{\ell})\leq t_{\ell},\,\omega_{\star}(y;U_{\ell})\leq e_{\ell}\mbox{ for all $1\leq\ell\leq L$}\right\}.
|\overline{U}_{\ell}^{1}|,|\overline{U}_{\ell}^{2}|\leq t_{\ell},\quad|\overline{U}_{\ell}^{\star}|\leq e_{\ell},\quad|\overline{U}_{\ell}^{1}\cup\overline{U}_{\ell}^{2}\cup\overline{U}_{\ell}^{\star}|=\sigma_{\ell}\mbox{ for all $1\leq\ell\leq L$}.
|\overline{U}_{\ell}^{1}|,|\overline{U}_{\ell}^{2}|\leq t_{\ell},\quad|\overline{U}_{\ell}^{\star}|\leq e_{\ell},\quad|\overline{U}_{\ell}^{1}\cup\overline{U}_{\ell}^{2}\cup\overline{U}_{\ell}^{\star}|=\sigma_{\ell}\mbox{ for all $1\leq\ell\leq L$}.
U:=(ℓ=1⋃LUℓ1)∪(ℓ=1⋃LUℓ2)∪(ℓ=1⋃LUℓ⋆)⊆[s].
U:=(ℓ=1⋃LUℓ1)∪(ℓ=1⋃LUℓ2)∪(ℓ=1⋃LUℓ⋆)⊆[s].
|\bm{V}|,|\bm{V^{\prime}}|\leq\bm{t}+\bm{e}\quad\mbox{ and }\quad\textnormal{H}_{\bm{t},\bm{e}}\langle\bm{V}\rangle(x^{k})\cap\textnormal{H}_{\bm{t},\bm{e}}\langle\bm{V^{\prime}}\rangle(x^{\prime k})\neq\emptyset\quad\mbox{
for all $1\leq k\leq n$}.
|\bm{V}|,|\bm{V^{\prime}}|\leq\bm{t}+\bm{e}\quad\mbox{ and }\quad\textnormal{H}_{\bm{t},\bm{e}}\langle\bm{V}\rangle(x^{k})\cap\textnormal{H}_{\bm{t},\bm{e}}\langle\bm{V^{\prime}}\rangle(x^{\prime k})\neq\emptyset\quad\mbox{
for all $1\leq k\leq n$}.
Ht,e⟨U⟩n,cp(x)∩Ht,e⟨U⟩n,cp(x′)
Ht,e⟨U⟩n,cp(x)∩Ht,e⟨U⟩n,cp(x′)
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Full text
Adversarial Network Coding
Alberto Ravagnani and Frank R. Kschischang
The author was
partially supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation through
grant n. P2NEP2_168527.
The Edward S. Rogers
Sr. Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
University of Toronto, Toronto, ON M5S 3G4, Canada
Email: {ravagnani,frank}@ece.utoronto.ca.
Abstract
A combinatorial framework for adversarial network coding is presented.
Channels are described by specifying the possible
actions that one or more (possibly coordinated) adversaries may take.
Upper bounds on three notions of capacity—the one-shot capacity, the
zero-error capacity, and the compound zero-error capacity—are obtained
for point-to-point channels, and generalized to corresponding capacity
regions appropriate for multi-source networks. A key result of this
paper is a general method by which bounds on these capacities in
point-to-point channels may be ported to networks. This technique is
illustrated in detail for Hamming-type channels with multiple
adversaries operating on specific coordinates, which correspond, in the
context of networks, to multiple adversaries acting on specific network
edges. Capacity-achieving coding schemes are described for some of the
considered adversarial models.
1 Introduction
In this
paper, we propose a mathematical framework for adversarial
network coding, introducing combinatorial tools and techniques for the
analysis of
communication networks under adversarial models. The actions that one
or more adversaries may take are described using fan-out sets, thereby
allowing for a wide variety of possible communication scenarios. The
framework applies to single and multi-source networks, and to single and
multiple adversaries of various kinds. Three notions of capacity,
called “one-shot”, “zero-error”, and “compound zero-error” are
defined. For networks, we study three corresponding notions of capacity
region, establishing bounds and describing capacity-achieving schemes.
Since 2002, the problem of correcting errors caused by an adversary in
the context of network coding has been an active research area. The
fundamentals of error correction within network coding schemes were
originally investigated in [1, 2] by Cai and Yeung,
who studied errors and erasures in the framework of single-source
networks, and established the network analogues of the Singleton and the
Hamming bounds. Other bounds were derived in [2] for
regular networks [2, Definition 4]. Bounds and
error-correcting code constructions also appeared in [1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8].
Various adversarial models have been investigated in the context of
network coding. For example, Byzantine attacks are studied in [9] and [10], in which omniscient
adversaries, secret-sharing models, and adversaries of limited
eavesdropping power are considered. Adversaries who can control some of
the network’s vertices are investigated in [11, 12].
End-to-end approaches to error control in random and coherent network
coding were proposed in [13, 14, 15], along with efficient
coding and decoding schemes based on rank-metric and subspace codes.
Other models were proposed in [16, 17, 18].
Adversaries controlling a channel state within probabilistic channel models
were studied in [19].
Fan-out set descriptions of adversaries
in point-to-point channels
were proposed in [15, Section III],
investigating connections
between such descriptions
and the concept of correction capability of a code.
The problem of error correction in the context of multi-source random
linear network coding was recently addressed in [20, 21, 22, 23],
and capacity-achieving schemes were given in [23].
Although a wide variety of network adversarial models have been studied
by various authors (mainly focusing on single-source linear network
coding), a unified combinatorial treatment of adversarial network
channels seems to be absent. One of the goals of this paper is to fill
this gap. In particular, this paper makes the following contributions.
Whereas noisy channels are described within a theory of “probability,”
adversarial channels are described within a theory of “possibility.”
Accordingly, throughout this paper, we take a combinatorial approach to
defining and studying channels, rather than a probabilistic one. This
approach is inspired by Shannon’s work [24] on the
zero-error capacity of a channel, and motivated by the fact that a network adversary may not
be specified in general via random variables and probability distributions. In Section 2 we
define codes, one-shot capacity, channel products, and the zero-error
capacity of a channel, and we describe how this approach relates to
Shannon’s work. In Section 3, we define two
fundamental channel operations: “concatenation” and “union,” and we
establish their main algebraic properties. We also show how they relate
to each other and to the notions of capacity.
In Section 4 we study certain adversarial channels
called “Hamming-type channels,” whose input alphabet is a cartesian
product of the form As. We consider multiple adversaries who can
corrupt or erase the components of an element x∈As, according
to certain restrictions, and explicitly compute the one-shot capacity,
the zero-error capacity and the compound zero-error capacity of these
channels (see Subsection 4.2 for the definitions).
This extends a number of classical results in Coding Theory.
The study of networks starts with Section 5. In contrast
to previous approaches (e.g., [1, 2]), our framework
allows for multi-source networks with a wide variety of adversarial
models. We propose three notions of capacity region of a multi-source
adversarial network, which we call the “one-shot capacity region”, the
“zero-error capacity region”, and the “compound zero-error capacity
region” (see Subsection 5.4 for precise
definitions). Most previous work in adversarial network coding
implicitly
focus on one-shot models (cf. also Remark 5.4.5), while to our best knowledge zero-error and
compound zero-error adversarial models have not so far been investigated.
The centerpiece of this paper is Section 6, in which
we show that any upper bounds for the capacities of Hamming-type
channels can be ported to the networking context in a systematic manner.
Using the channel operations defined in Section 3, we
show that this “porting technique” applies to all three notions of
capacity region mentioned above, in the general context of multi-source
networks. Moreover, this method does not require the underlying
network to be regular, in the sense of [2, Definition 4].
These theoretical results are then applied to concrete networking
contexts in Section 7, where we study multiple
adversaries, each with possibly different error and erasure powers,
having access to prescribed subsets of the network edges. The
adversaries are in principle allowed to coordinate with each other. We
derive upper bounds for the three capacity regions of such adversarial
networks, extending certain results of [2] to multiple
adversaries (restricted or not) and multi-source networks.
In Section 8, we give capacity-achieving schemes
for some of the adversarial scenarios investigated in
Section 7. Incorporating ideas from [23]
and [25], we show that linear network coding suffices to
achieve any integer point of the capacity regions associated with some
simple adversaries. We then adapt these communication schemes to
compound models. Finally, we show that for some adversarial networks
capacity cannot be achieved with linear network coding.
Other classes of adversaries (such as rank-metric adversaries and
multiple adversaries having access to overlapping sets of the network
edges) are briefly discussed in Section 9.
Finally,
Section 10 is devoted to conclusions and a discussion of
open problems.
2 Adversarial Channels
In this section we define and study point-to-point adversarial channels,
one-shot codes, and one-shot capacity. We then describe the channel
product construction, and define the zero-error capacity of an
adversarial channel, as proposed by Shannon in [24].
Although most of this material is well known, this section serves to
establish notation that will be used throughout the paper.
2.1 Channels, Codes, Capacity
An adversarial channel is described by an input alphabet X, an
output alphabet Y, and a collection {Ω(x):x∈X} of
subsets of Y, one for each x∈X. The set Ω(x)⊆Y is interpreted as the fan-out set of x, i.e., the set of
all symbols y∈Y that the adversary can cause to be received when
the input symbol x∈X is transmitted. This motivates the
following definition.
Definition 2.1.1**.**
An (adversarial) channel is a map
Ω:X→2Y∖{∅}, where X and Y
are finite non-empty sets called input and outputalphabet, respectively. We denote such an adversarial channel
by Ω:X⇢Y, and say that Ω is
deterministic if ∣Ω(x)∣=1 for all x∈X. A
deterministic channel can be identified naturally with the function X→Y that associates to x∈X the unique element
y∈Ω(x).
In this paper we will restrict our attention to channels whose input and
output alphabets are finite.
Definition 2.1.2**.**
Let Ω:X⇢Y be a channel. A (one-shot) code
for Ω is a non-empty
subset C⊆X.
We say that C is good for Ω when
Ω(x)∩Ω(x′)=∅ for all x,x′∈C with
x=x′.
In words, a good code for a channel Ω:X⇢Y is a
selection of input symbols from X whose fan-out sets are pairwise
disjoint. If channel inputs are restricted to a good code, it is
impossible for an adversary to cause confusion at the receiver about the
transmitted symbol.
Definition 2.1.3**.**
The (one-shot) capacity of a channel Ω:X⇢Y
is the base-2 logarithm
of the largest cardinality of a good code for Ω, i.e.,
[TABLE]
Clearly, the capacity of any channel Ω:X⇢Y
satisfies 0≤C1(Ω)≤min{log2∣X∣,log2∣Y∣}.
Example 2.1.4**.**
Let X,Y be finite non-empty sets with Y⊇X.
The identity channelId:X⇢Y is defined by
Ω(x):={x} for all x∈X.
We have C1(Id)=log2∣X∣.
Example 2.1.5**.**
Let X:=F24. Consider an adversary who is capable of corrupting
at most one of the components of any x∈F24. The action of the
adversary is described by the channel
H:F24⇢F24 defined by H(x):={y∈F24:dH(x,y)≤1}
for all x∈F24,
where dH is the Hamming distance. The code
C={(0000),(1111)} is good for H, and there is no good code
with larger cardinality. Therefore we have C1(H)=1.
Channels with the same input and output alphabets can be compared as follows.
Definition 2.1.6**.**
Let Ω1,Ω2:X⇢Y be channels.
We say that Ω1 is
finer than Ω2 (in symbols, Ω1≤Ω2 or Ω2≥Ω1) when
Ω1(x)⊆Ω2(x)
for all x∈X.
If Ω1≤Ω2, then every code that is good for
Ω2 is good for Ω1 as well. Therefore we have
C1(Ω1)≥C1(Ω2).
2.2 Products of Channels
Adversarial channels Ω1 and Ω2 can be naturally combined
with each other via a product construction,
giving rise to a third channel denoted by Ω1×Ω2.
Definition 2.2.1**.**
The product of channels Ω1:X1⇢Y1 and
Ω2:X2⇢Y2
is the channel
Ω1×Ω2:X1×X2⇢Y1×Y2
defined by
[TABLE]
The following result shows two important properties of the channel product.
Proposition 2.2.2**.**
Let Ω1,Ω2,Ω3 be channels. Then
(Ω1×Ω2)×Ω3=Ω1×(Ω2×Ω3),
2. 2.
C1(Ω1×Ω2)≥C1(Ω1)+C1(Ω2).
Proof.
The first property is straightforward. To see the second, observe that
if C1 and C2 are good codes
for Ω1 and Ω2 (respectively), then
C1×C2 is good for Ω1×Ω2.
∎
The associativity of the channel product (part 1 of
Proposition 2.2.2) allows expressions
such as Ω1×Ω2×Ω3 to be written
without danger of ambiguity.
Definition 2.2.3**.**
Let n≥1 be an integer. The n-th power of a channel
Ω:X⇢Y is the channel
[TABLE]
The n-th power of Ω:X⇢Y models
n uses of Ω. Recall that the elements of
Ω(x) represent the outputs that an adversary can produce from the input
x∈X. If the channel Ω is used n times, then we have
Ωn(x1,...,xn)=Ω(x1)×⋯×Ω(xn).
Remark 2.2.4**.**
In general, the lower bound of part 2 of
Proposition 2.2.2 is not tight, i.e., the capacity of the
product channel Ω1×Ω2 can be strictly larger than the
sum of the capacities of the
channels Ω1 and Ω2.
The following example, which will be used repeatedly in the paper,
illustrates this point.
Example 2.2.5**.**
Let H:F24⇢F24 be the channel of
Example 2.1.5, which has capacity
C1(H)=1. The code
C:={(00000000),(00011101),(10100111),(11010110),(11101000)}⊆F24×F24
is good for the product channel H×H. Therefore
C1(H×H)≥log2(5)>2=C1(H)+C1(H).
For x=(x1,...,x8)∈F24×F24, let
x1:=(x1,...,x4) and x2:=(x5,...,x8). Then
a code C⊆F24×F24 is good for H2 if and
only if dH(x1,y1)≥3 or dH(x2,y2)≥3
for all x,y∈C
with x=y.
We conclude the example by showing a structural property of any good code
C for H2 with ∣C∣=5. The property will be needed later in
Example 5.4.6.
Let C⊆F24×F24 be any good code for H2
with ∣C∣=5.
We claim that there are no two codewords of
C that coincide in the first four components.
To see this, denote by x,y,z,t,u the elements of C, and assume by
contradiction that, say,
x1=y1. Without loss of generality, we may assume x=0 (and thus y1=0).
Then the vectors z1,t1,u1 must have Hamming weight at least 3.
Indeed, if, say, z1
has Hamming weight smaller than 3, then {x2,y2,z2}⊆F24 is a
code of cardinality
3 and minimum Hamming distance 3, contradicting the fact that
C1(H)=1.
On the other hand, since z1,t1,u1 have Hamming weight at least 3, we have
dH(z1,t1),dH(z1,u1),dH(t1,u1)≤2. Since C is good
for H2, {z2,t2,u2} must be
a code of cardinality
3 and minimum Hamming distance 3, again contradicting
the fact that C1(H)=1.
2.3 Adjacency Structure of a Channel
In this subsection we introduce the adjacency function of a channel, and
propose a definition of isomorphic channels. In particular, we relate
the fan-out set description of channels adopted in this paper with the graph-theoretic
approach taken by Shannon in [24].
Definition 2.3.1**.**
The adjacency functionαΩ:X×X→{0,1}
of a channel
Ω:X⇢Y is defined, for all x,x′∈X, by
[TABLE]
We say that channels Ω1:X1⇢Y1 and
Ω2:X2⇢Y2
are isomorphic (in symbols, Ω1≅Ω2) if there
exists a bijection f:X1→X2 such that
αΩ1(x,x′)=αΩ2(f(x),f(x′)) for all
(x,x′)∈X1×X2.
The adjacency function of
Ω captures the “ambiguity relations” among the
input symbols of Ω.
Channels Ω1 and Ω2 are isomorphic if their input symbols have the
same ambiguity relations, for some identification of their input alphabets.
The isomorphism class of a channel Ω:X⇢Y can be represented
via a graph G as follows. Up to a suitable bijection, the vertices of G are the elements of
V={0,1,...,∣X∣−1}, and (x,x′)∈V×V is an edge
of G if and only if αΩ(x,x′)=1. Therefore αΩ is
precisely the adjacency matrix of the graph
G.
This is the way channels are
described and studied by Shannon in [24]. Note that,
although every vertex of G is by definition adjacent to itself, loops are
usually not shown in the graph description.
Example 2.3.2** (The “pentagon channel”).**
Let X=Y:={0,1,2,3,4}, and let Ω:X⇢Y be the channel defined by
[TABLE]
The five fan-out sets of Ω are represented as in
Figure 1(a), and
a graph representation of the isomorphism class of
Ω is depicted in Figure 1(b). The channel Ω was first introduced and studied
by Shannon in [24].
One can show that channel isomorphism is an equivalence relation. Moreover, the
following properties of isomorphic channels hold. The proof simple and left to
the reader.
Proposition 2.3.3**.**
Let Ω1,Ω2,Ω3,Ω4 be channels.
If Ω1≅Ω2 and Ω3≅Ω4, then
Ω1×Ω3≅Ω2×Ω4.
2. 2.
If Ω1≅Ω2, then Ω1n≅Ω2n for all n∈N≥1.
3. 3.
If Ω1≅Ω2, then
C1(Ω1)=C1(Ω2).
2.4 Zero-Error Capacity
In this subsection we define the zero-error capacity of an adversarial channel, and relate it to
the one-shot capacity.
Given the graph-theoretic description of channels illustrated in Subsection 2.3,
the following results essentially already appear in Shannon’s paper [24].
We state them in the language of fan-out sets for convenience.
See [26] for a general reference on Zero-Error Information Theory.
Definition 2.4.1**.**
The zero-error capacity of a channel Ω is
the number
[TABLE]
Remark 2.4.2**.**
It is easy to see that C0(Ω) is a non-negative number for every channel
Ω, i.e., that 0≤C0(Ω)<+∞. A less immediate (though intuitive) property
is that supremum in the definition of zero-capacity is in fact a limit.
This can be shown using Fekete’s Lemma for superadditive
sequences (see [27] or [28, Section 1.9]).
As one may expect, the zero error-capacity of a channel only depends on its
isomorphism class.
This fact follows from property 2 of
Proposition 2.3.3.
Proposition 2.4.3**.**
Let Ω1,Ω2 be channels. If Ω1≅Ω2, then
C0(Ω1)=C0(Ω2).
The next result shows how one-shot capacity and zero-error capacity relate to each other.
Proposition 2.4.4**.**
Let Ω:X⇢Y be a channel. The following hold.
C1(Ωn)≥n⋅C1(Ω) for all n≥1.
Thus C0(Ω)≥C1(Ω).
2. 2.
If C1(Ω)=0, then C0(Ω)=0.
Proof.
Let C⊆X be good for Ω with
log2∣C∣=C1(Ω), and let n∈N≥1. Then Cn
is good for Ωn.
Thus C1(Ωn)/n≥C1(Ω).
Since n is arbitrary, this implies in particular that
C0(Ω)≥C1(Ω).
2. 2.
Since C1(Ω)=0, for all x,x′∈X we have
Ω(x)∩Ω(x′)=∅.
Assume by way of contradiction that C0(Ω)>0. Then
there exists n∈N≥1
with
C1(Ωn)>0. In particular, there exists a good code
C⊆Xn
for Ωn with ∣C∣≥2. Let (x1,...,xn),(x1′,...,xn′)∈C with
(x1,...,xn)=(x1′,...,xn′).
Then
[TABLE]
a contradiction. Therefore it must be that C0(Ω)=0, as claimed. ∎
Remark 2.4.5**.**
In general, the zero-error capacity of a channel Ω is strictly
larger than its one-shot capacity.
For example, let H be the channel of
Example 2.1.5. We showed that
C1(H2)/2>C1(H), which implies that
C0(H)>C1(H).
The zero-error capacity of a channel is a combinatorial invariant which is in general
very difficult to compute. For example, let Ω be the pentagon channel
of Example 2.3.2. In [24] Shannon showed that
log25≤C0(Ω)≤log25−1. The exact value
of C0(Ω) was computed only
twenty-three years later by Lovász in [29], using
sophisticated Graph Theory techniques. The result is C0(Ω)=log25.
3 Operations with Channels
In this section we introduce two operations with channels, namely, concatenation and union,
showing how they relate to each other and to the channel product.
These two constructions will play an important role throughout the paper
in the study of several classes of adversarial point-to-point and network channels.
3.1 Concatenation of Channels
We start with channel concatenation.
Definition 3.1.1**.**
Let Ω1:X1⇢Y1 and Ω2:X2⇢Y2 be channels, with Y1⊆X2.
The concatenation
of Ω1 and Ω2 is the channel
Ω1\RHDΩ2:X1⇢Y2 defined by
[TABLE]
This operation models the situation where the output of
Ω1 is taken as the input to Ω2 without any
intermediate processing.
Example 3.1.2**.**
Let Ω:F24→F24 be the channel introduced in Example 2.1.5.
Then for all x∈F24 we have
(Ω\RHDΩ)(x)={y∈F24:dH(x,y)≤2}.
Remark 3.1.3**.**
The isomorphism class of
Ω1\RHDΩ2 is not determined in general by the
isomorphism classes of Ω1 and Ω2, as the following example shows. This crucial difference
between channel product and channel concatenation
motivates the choice of
the fan-out sets language in this paper.
Example 3.1.4**.**
Let X=Y:={0,1,2}. Define the adversarial channels
Ω1,Ω2:X⇢Y by
Ω1(0):=Ω1(1):={0,1}, Ω1(2):={2},
Ω2(0):={0},
Ω2(1):=Ω2(2):={1,2}.
It is easy to see that Ω1≅Ω2.
However,
Ω1\RHDΩ1≅Ω2\RHDΩ1,
C1(Ω1\RHDΩ1)=C1(Ω2\RHDΩ1), and
C0(Ω1\RHDΩ1)=C0(Ω2\RHDΩ1).
The following result is the analogue of Proposition 2.2.2 for channel concatenation.
Proposition 3.1.5**.**
Let Ω1,Ω2,Ω3 be channels.
Then:
(Ω1\RHDΩ2)\RHDΩ3=Ω1\RHD(Ω2\RHDΩ3),
2. 2.
C1(Ω1\RHDΩ2)≤min{C1(Ω1),C1(Ω2)},
provided that all of the above concatenations are defined.
Proof.
Property 1 easily follows from the definition of concatenation.
To see property 2, suppose that Ω1:X1⇢Y1 and Ω2:X2⇢Y2 are channels with Y1⊆X2.
Let C⊆X1 be good for Ω1\RHDΩ2 with log2∣C∣=C1(Ω1\RHDΩ2).
We will show that C is good for Ω1. Assume that there exist
x,x′∈C with Ω1(x)∩Ω1(x′)=∅, and let y∈Ω1(x)∩Ω1(x′).
Then we have
∅=Ω2(y)⊆(Ω1\RHDΩ2)(x)∩(Ω1\RHDΩ2)(x),
a contradiction. Therefore C is good for Ω1, and so
C1(Ω1)≥log2∣C∣=C1(Ω1\RHDΩ2).
On the other hand, for every x∈C we can select yx∈Ω1(x)⊆Y1. It is easy to check
that C′:={yx:x∈C}⊆X2 is a good code for Ω2 with the same cardinality as C.
Therefore C1(Ω2)≥C1(Ω1\RHDΩ2).
∎
Note that the associativity of channel concatenation allows expressions such
as Ω1\RHDΩ2\RHDΩ3 to be written
without danger of ambiguity.
The following result provides an identity showing that the product of the concatenation of channels is the concatenation of their products. This property and its corollary will be needed later for the analysis of certain classes of network channels
(see Lemma 6.2.3). The proof can be found in Appendix A, and
the result is illustrated in Figure 2.
Proposition 3.1.6**.**
Let n,m∈N≥1, and let
Ωk,i be channels, for 1≤k≤n and 1≤i≤m.
Then
[TABLE]
provided that all the above concatenations are defined.
Corollary 3.1.7**.**
Let Ω be a channel, and let n≥1 be an integer. Assume that
Ω1,...,Ωn and Ω1′,...,Ωn′ are channels for which
the concatenation Ωk\RHDΩ\RHDΩk′ is defined for all
1≤k≤n. Then
[TABLE]
We can now establish the
zero-error analogue of part 2 of
Proposition 3.1.5.
Proposition 3.1.8**.**
Let Ω1:X1⇢Y1 and Ω2:X2⇢Y2 be channels, with Y1⊆X2.
We have
C0(Ω1\RHDΩ2)≤min{C0(Ω1),C0(Ω2)}.
Proof.
Fix any integer n≥1. Combining Proposition 3.1.5 with Proposition 3.1.6 one
obtains
[TABLE]
Therefore
[TABLE]
as claimed.
∎
3.2 Union of Channels
We now define
the union of a family of channels having the same input and output alphabets.
This channel operation will be used later in
Sections 4 and
6
to study compound adversarial models.
Definition 3.2.1**.**
Let {Ωi}i∈I be a family of channels, where I is a finite index set and Ωi:X⇢Y
for all i∈I. The union of the family {Ωi}i∈I is the channel
denoted as and defined by
[TABLE]
One can check that
every channel can be written as the union of deterministic channels.
Moreover, union and concatenation relate to each other as follows.
The proof can be found in Appendix A.
Proposition 3.2.2**.**
Let {Ωi}i∈I be as in Definition 3.2.1.
Let Ω1, Ω2 be channels for which the concatenation
Ω1\RHDΩi\RHDΩ2 is defined for all i∈I
(we do not require {1,2}∩I=∅). Then
[TABLE]
4 Hamming-Type Channels
In this section we study channels whose input alphabet
is of the form As, where
A is a finite set with ∣A∣≥2 (the alphabet), and s∈N≥1.
We call these channels “Hamming-type channels”.
In the sequel we work with a fixed alphabet A and a fixed integer s. If u≥1 is any integer, we write [u] for the set {1,...,u}.
We also define the extended alphabetA^:=A∪{⋆}, where ⋆∈/A is a symbol denoting an erasure.
Notation 4.0.1**.**
It is convenient for Hamming-type channels to express the capacity as a logarithm in base
∣A∣, rather than in base 2. In this paper, if Ω:As⇢Y is a channel, where Y is any output alphabet, we abuse notation and write
C1(Ω) for C1(Ω)⋅log2∣A∣, and
C0(Ω) for C0(Ω)⋅log2∣A∣.
The components
of a vector x∈As are denoted by x=(x1,...,xs).
If n≥1 is an integer, we denote by
(x1,...,xn) a generic element of (As)n.
4.1 Error-and-Erasure Adversaries
We start by recalling some well known concepts from classical Coding Theory.
Notation 4.1.1**.**
If u≥1 is an integer, then the minimum (Hamming) distance of a set
C⊆Au with cardinality
∣C∣≥2 is dH(C):=min{dH(x,x′):x,x′∈C,x=x′}.
For all 1≤d≤u, we set
β(A,u,d):=0 if there is no C⊆Au with ∣C∣≥2 and dH(C)≥d, and β(A,u,d):=max{log∣A∣∣C∣:C⊆Au,∣C∣≥2,dH(C)≥d} otherwise.
We will also need the following definitions.
Definition 4.1.2**.**
Let U⊆[s] be a set. The U-discrepancy between vectors y∈A^s and x∈As is the integer δ(y,x;U):=∣{i∈U:yi∈A\mboxandyi=xi}∣. The U-erasure weight of a vector y∈A^s is
ω⋆(y;U):=∣{i∈U:yi=⋆}∣.
Evidently, if x∈As is sent and y∈A^s is received, the U-discrepancy measures the number of errors that
occurred in positions indexed by U, while the U-erasure weight
measures the number of erasures that occurred in those positions.
We now describe an adversary having access to a certain set of coordinates U⊆[s],
and with limited error and erasure power.
Definition 4.1.3**.**
Let U⊆[s] and t,e≥0 be integers.
The channel Ht,e⟨U⟩:As⇢A^s is defined by
[TABLE]
Note that Ht,e⟨U⟩ models the scenario where an adversary can erase up to e
components with indices from the set U, and change up to t such components into different symbols from A.
It is well known from classical Coding Theory that
C1(Ht,e⟨[s]⟩)=β(A,s,2t+e+1).
We now generalize this upper bound to the case where the adversary can only operate on a
subset U⊆[s].
Proposition 4.1.4**.**
Let U⊆[s] be a set of cardinality u:=∣U∣, and let t,e≥0 be integers. Then
[TABLE]
Proof.
The result is immediate if U=∅ or U=[s]. Assume
0<∣U∣<s. Denote by π:As→As−u the projection on the coordinates
outside U, and let C⊆As be a capacity-achieving good code for
Ht,e⟨U⟩. By restricting the domain and the codomain of π,
we obtain a surjective map
π:C→π(C)⊆As−u. It is easy to see that
for all z∈π(C) we have log∣A∣∣π−1(z)∣≤β(A,u,2t+e+1).
We can write C as a disjoint union
C=⨆z∈π(C)π−1(z),
from which we see that ∣C∣≤∣π(C)∣⋅∣A∣β, where β:=β(A,u,2t+e+1). Therefore
[TABLE]
Finally, the upper bound in (1) is achieved by any code of the form
C=D×As−u, where D⊆Au is a code with ∣D∣=1 if u≤2t+e,
and a code with log∣A∣∣D∣=β(A,s,u) and minimum distance at least 2t+e+1 otherwise.
Note that not all codes C that achieve (1) with equality are of this form.
∎
A more general scenario consists of multiple adversaries acting on pairwise disjoint
sets of coordinates with different powers. Such a collection of adversaries can be
described as follows.
Definition 4.1.5**.**
Let L≥1 and U1,...,UL⊆[s] be pairwise disjoint subsets. Let t1,...,tL
and e1,...,eL be non-negative integers.
Set U:=(U1,...,UL), t:=(t1,...,tL) and e:=(e1,...,eL). The channel
Ht,e⟨U⟩:As⇢A^s is defined, for all x∈As, by
[TABLE]
Definition 4.1.5 models a channel with L adversaries associated with
pairwise disjoint sets of coordinates U1,...,UL⊆[s].
The ℓ-th adversary can erase up to eℓ components of a
vector x∈As, and change up to tℓ such components of x
into different symbols from A.
Remark 4.1.6**.**
The channel Ht,e⟨U⟩ is isomorphic, in the sense of Definition 2.3.1, to
a product of channels. To see this, assume without loss of generality that
Uℓ=∅ for all 1≤ℓ≤L. Let uℓ:=∣Uℓ∣ for all 1≤ℓ≤L, and denote by
πℓ:A^s→A^uℓ the projection on the coordinates in Uℓ.
For any integer r≥1, we let Idr:Ar⇢A^r be the identity channel (see Example 2.1.4).
For 1≤ℓ≤L, define the channel Htℓ,eℓ⟨Uℓ⟩:Auℓ⇢A^uℓ by
Htℓ,eℓ⟨Uℓ⟩(x):={πℓ(y):y∈Htℓ,eℓ⟨Uℓ⟩(x)}, for all x∈As. Finally,
let u:=∣u1∣+⋯+∣uL∣. One can directly check that Ht,e⟨U⟩≅Ht1,e1⟨U1⟩×⋯×HtL,eL⟨UL⟩ if
u=s, and that Ht,e⟨U⟩≅Ht1,e1⟨U1⟩×⋯×HtL,eL⟨UL⟩×Ids−u if u<s.
Remark 4.1.7**.**
The upper bound of Proposition 4.1.4 does not extend additively to multiple adversaries.
More precisely, if L, U, t and e
are as in Definition 4.1.5, then in general
[TABLE]
as the following example shows. This reflects the fact that L adversaries
acting on different sets Uℓ’s, with error and erasure powers tℓ’s and eℓ’s, are not equivalent to a single adversary acting on the set U1∪⋯∪UL with error and erasure powers
t1+⋯+tℓ and e1+⋯+eℓ, respectively.
In particular, upper bounds from classical Coding Theory do not
extend in any obvious way from one to multiple adversaries.
Example 4.1.8**.**
Take A:=F2, L:=2, s:=8, U1:={1,2,3,4}, U2:={5,6,7,8}, t1:=t2:=1 and
e1:=e2:=0. Let H denote the channel of Example 2.1.5.
Then β(F2,4,3)=C1(H)=1. By definition of H, we have
Ht,e⟨U⟩≅H×H. Therefore Example 2.2.5 implies
[TABLE]
4.2 Compound Channels
In Section 2 we introduced the concepts
of (one-shot) capacity and zero-error capacity for general adversarial channels. We now define a third
notion of capacity for the specific class of Hamming-type channels, which we call
the compound zero-error capacity.
Notation 4.2.1**.**
Let L≥1 be an integer, and let Vℓ⊆[s], for
1≤ℓ≤L, be sets. If V=(V1,...,VL), we define
∣V∣:=(∣V1∣,...,∣VL∣)∈NL. If Uℓ⊆[s] for all 1≤ℓ≤L and
U=(U1,...,Uℓ), then we write V⊆U
when Vℓ⊆Uℓ for all 1≤ℓ≤L.
Given integer vectors v=(v1,...,vL),u=(u1,...,uL)∈NL, we write
v≤u if vℓ≤uℓ for all 1≤ℓ≤L.
Let L≥1 and U1,...,UL⊆[s] be pairwise disjoint subsets. Let t1,...,tL
and e1,...,eL be non-negative integers.
Define the L-tuples U:=(U1,...,UL), t:=(t1,...,tL) and e:=(e1,...,eL).
We consider the situation where a channel
Ht,e⟨U⟩ is used n times, but the adversaries are forced
to act on the same sets of coordinates in every channel use.
By this we mean that the ℓ-th adversary freely chooses a set
of
components Vℓ⊆Uℓ whose size does not exceed tℓ+eℓ, and
operates on those components in each channel use, according to
its error/erasure power.
The set of vulnerable components is unknown to the source,
and no feedback is allowed.
This scenario can be mathematically modeled via the channel union operation (see Subsection 3.2) as follows.
Definition 4.2.2**.**
Let L≥1, U:=(U1,...,UL), t:=(t1,...,tL) and e:=(e1,...,eL)
be as in Definition 4.1.5.
For n≥1, the compound channelHt,e⟨U⟩n,cp:(As)n⇢(A^s)n is defined by
[TABLE]
The
compound zero-error capacity of the channel
Ht,e⟨U⟩ is the number
[TABLE]
Note that in the definition of compound channel the union is taken over all
the V⊆U with ∣V∣≤t+e, and not with
∣V∣=t+e. This is because, by Definition 4.1.5, we allow
tℓ+eℓ>∣Uℓ∣ for some ℓ (so there may be no
V⊆U with ∣V∣=t+e).
This choice may seem unnatural at this point, but it will simplify the discussion
on Hamming-type channels induced by network adversaries
in Subsection 6.2.
The following proposition shows how one-shot capacity,
zero-error capacity and compound zero-error capacity relate to each other.
The proof is left to the reader.
Proposition 4.2.3**.**
Let L≥1, U:=(U1,...,UL),
t:=(t1,...,tL) and e:=(e1,...,eL)
be as in Definition 4.1.5.
For all n≥1 we have
[TABLE]
In particular,
[TABLE]
4.3 Capacities of Hamming-Type Channels
The goal of this subsection is to establish the following general theorem
on the capacities of a Hamming-type channel of the form Ht,e⟨U⟩.
Theorem 4.3.1**.**
Let L≥1, U:=(U1,...,UL), t:=(t1,...,tL) and e:=(e1,...,eL)
be as in Definition 4.1.5.
For all n≥1 we have
[TABLE]
In particular,
[TABLE]
Moreover, all the above
inequalities are achieved with equality if A=Fq and q is sufficiently large.
We will need the following preliminary result, whose proof can be found in Appendix A.
Lemma 4.3.2**.**
Let L≥1, U:=(U1,...,UL), t:=(t1,...,tL) and
e:=(e1,...,eL)
be as in Definition 4.1.5. Define σℓ:=min{2tℓ+eℓ,∣Uℓ∣} for all 1≤ℓ≤L,
and σ:=σ1+⋯+σL≤s.
There exist sets
Uℓ1,Uℓ2,Uℓ⋆⊆Uℓ, for
1≤ℓ≤L, with the following properties:
[TABLE]
2. 2.
We have σ=∣U∣,
where
[TABLE]
3. 3.
There exist V=(V1,...,VL)⊆U
and V′=(V1′,...,VL′)⊆U
with the following properties:
•
∣V∣,∣V′∣≤t+e;
•
for any x,x′∈As, if xi=xi′ for all i∈[s]∖U,
then
Ht,e⟨V⟩(x)∩Ht,e⟨V′⟩(x′)=∅.
Let σℓ:=min{2tℓ+eℓ,∣Uℓ∣} for all 1≤ℓ≤L,
and σ:=σ1+⋯+σL. We only show
the theorem for σ<s. The case σ=s is similar and in fact easier.
By Proposition 4.2.3, it suffices to show that
C1(Ht,e⟨U⟩n,cp)≤n(s−σ) for all n≥1, and that for
A=Fq and sufficiently large q we have C1(Ht,e⟨U⟩)≥s−σ.
Let
Uℓ1, Uℓ2, Uℓ⋆
(for 1≤ℓ≤L) and U be as in Lemma
4.3.2.
We have
σ=∣U∣. Denote by π:As→As−σ the projection on the coordinates outside U.
Since σ<s, the map π is well defined.
Let n≥1 be an integer. Then π extends component-wise to a map
Π:(As)n→(As−σ)n. Let C⊆(As)n
be a capacity-achieving good code for Ht,e⟨U⟩n,cp.
To obtain the upper bound, it suffices to show that
the restriction of Π to C is injective.
Take x,x′∈C, and assume
Π(x)=Π(x′). We will show that x=x′. Write x=(x1,...,xn) and x′=(x′1,...,x′n).
By definition of Π, we have π(xk)=π(x′k) for all 1≤k≤n.
By Lemma 4.3.2, there exist
L-tuples of sets
V=(V1,...,VL)⊆U and
V′=(V1′,...,VL′)⊆U
such that:
[TABLE]
By definition of Ht,e⟨U⟩n,cp we have
[TABLE]
where the last inequality follows from (3).
Since C is good for Ht,e⟨U⟩n,cp,
we conclude x=x′. This shows that the restriction of Π to C is injective, as desired.
We now prove that the upper bounds in the theorem are tight for A=Fq and q
sufficiently large.
As already stated at the beginning of the proof, it suffices to show that C1(Ht,e⟨U⟩)≥s−σ.
Let
C⊆As be any code with minimum distance dH(C)=σ+1
and cardinality qs−σ. We will prove that C is
good for Ht,e⟨U⟩. Let x,x′∈C with x=x′, and assume by way
of contradiction that there exists
z∈Ht,e⟨U⟩(x)∩Ht,e⟨U⟩(x′).
For 1≤ℓ≤L construct the sets
[TABLE]
By definition of Ht,e⟨U⟩, for all 1≤ℓ≤L we have
∣Uℓ1∪Uℓ2∪Uℓ⋆∣≤min{2tℓ+eℓ,∣Uℓ∣}=σℓ.
Note moreover that
Uℓ1∪Uℓ2∪Uℓ⋆={i∈Uℓ:zi=xi\mboxorzi=xi′} for all 1≤ℓ≤L.
Since the sets Uℓ’s are pairwise disjoint, we have
[TABLE]
Thus z, x and x′ coincide in at least s−σ components,
and therefore dH(x,x′)≤σ, a contradiction.
∎
4.4 Hamming-Type Channels over Product Alphabets
We now consider channels of the form (Bm)s⇢(B^m)s, where B
is a finite set
with ∣B∣≥2, B^=B∪{⋆}, ⋆∈/B, m∈N≥2
and s∈N≥1.
Therefore the input alphabet is A=Bm.
For x=(x1,...,xs)∈(B^m)s and i∈[m], we denote by
xi=(xi,1,...,xi,m) the
sub-components of xi.
Definition 4.4.1**.**
For y∈B^m and x∈Bm, we let δ(y,x):=∣{i∈[m]:yi∈B\mboxandyi=xi}∣ be the discrepancy between y and x.
The erasure weight of y∈B^m is
ω⋆(y):=∣{i∈[m]:yi=⋆}∣.
Consider an adversary who has access to all the s components
of x=(x1,...,xs)∈(Bm)s. For each component xi∈Bm,
the adversary can corrupt up to t sub-components of xi, and erase at most e of them.
This scenario is modeled as follows.
Definition 4.4.2**.**
Let t,e≥0 be integers. The channel Ht,e⟨B,m,s⟩:(Bm)s⇢(B^m)s
is defined, for all x=(x1,...,xs)∈(Bm)s, by
[TABLE]
We conclude this section computing the capacity and the zero-error capacity
of a channel of the form Ht,e⟨B,m,s⟩. In the following
theorem capacities are expressed as logarithms in base ∣A∣=∣B∣m.
Theorem 4.4.3**.**
Let t,e≥0 be integers. For all n≥1 we have
[TABLE]
In particular,
[TABLE]
Moreover, all the above
inequalities are achieved with equality if A=Fq and q is sufficiently large.
Proof.
It follows from the definitions that the channel Ht,e⟨B,m,s⟩ coincides with the
s-th power of the Hamming-type channel Ht,e⟨[m]⟩:Bm⇢B^m
of Definition 4.1.3
(over the alphabet B and with input symbols from Bm).
Similarly, the n-th power of Ht,e⟨B,m,s⟩ coincides with the
ns-th power of Ht,e⟨[m]⟩:Bm⇢B^m.
Therefore the desired statement follows from Theorem 4.3.1.
∎
5 Networks, Adversaries, and Capacity Regions
In this section we start the analysis of networks by
studying combinational networks, network alphabets,
network codes, and adversaries. We show that these objects
naturally induce families of adversarial channels, which determine the capacity
regions of multi-source network under various adversarial models.
5.1 Combinational Networks
In the sequel, A denotes a finite set with cardinality ∣A∣≥2, which we call the network alphabet.
A network
is defined as follows.
Definition 5.1.1**.**
A (combinational) network
is a 4-tuple N=(V,E,S,T) where:
(A)
(V,E) is a finite directed acyclic multigraph,
2. (B)
S⊆V is the set of sources,
3. (C)
T⊆V is the set of terminals or sinks.
Note that we allow multiple parallel directed edges. We also assume that the following hold.
(D)
∣S∣≥1, ∣T∣≥1, S∩T=∅.
2. (E)
For any S∈S and T∈T there exists a directed path from S to T.
3. (F)
Sources do not have incoming edges, and terminals do not have outgoing edges.
4. (G)
For every vertex V∈V∖(S∪T) there exists a directed path from
S to V for some S∈S, and a directed path from V to T for some T∈T.
The elements of V are called vertices. The elements of
V∖(S∪T) are the intermediate vertices.
We denote the set of incoming and outgoing edges of a V∈V by
in(V) and out(V), respectively.
We are interested in multicast problems over networks of type N=(V,E,S,T).
Our model will encompass the presence of one or multiple adversaries, capable of
corrupting the values of some network edges, or erasing them, according to certain restrictions.
The sources attempt to transmit
information packets to all the terminals simultaneously, sharing the network resources.
The packets are drawn from the network alphabet A.
The intermediate vertices emit packets that belong to the same alphabet A, but collect over the incoming edges
packets that belong a priori to the extended network alphabetA^=A∪{⋆},
where ⋆∈/A is a symbol denoting an erasure.
Remark 5.1.2**.**
The symbol ⋆ from the extended alphabet A^
should not be regarded as an ordinary alphabet symbol, but more
as an “erasure warning” symbol. This is the reason why we force the
intermediate vertices to emit packets from
A, rather than A^. If vertices were allowed to emit
any symbol from A^, the whole theory would simply reduce to that of a
network with a larger alphabet.
We assume that
every edge of N can carry precisely one element from A,
or possibly the erasure symbol ⋆. For examples, if the sources transmit vectors of length m
with entries from a finite field Fq, then A=Fqm, and
each edge carries mlog2(q) bits (and possibly
the symbol ⋆).
In every network use, an intermediate vertex collects packets over the
incoming edges, processes them,
and sends out packets over the outgoing edges. The outgoing packets are a
function of the incoming packets.
We assume that the intermediate vertices are memoryless,
and all network
transmissions are delay-free.
Removing idle edges if necessary, we may also assume without loss of generality
that every vertex sends information packets over every
outgoing edge. Along with property (G) of Definition 5.1.1, this
ensures in particular that every non-source vertex
receives a packet on each of its incoming edges.
Notation 5.1.3**.**
In the sequel we work with a fixed combinational
network N=(V,E,S,T). We choose an enumeration for
the sources of N, say S={S1,...,SN}, and
let I:={1,...,N} be the set of source indices.
For J⊆I, we let SJ:={Si:i∈J}.
For all i∈I, the local input alphabet of source Si∈S is Xi:=A∣out(Si)∣.
The global input alphabet of
the network N is
X:=X1×⋯×XN.
The topology of N induces a partial order ⪯ on E
as follows. For
e,e′∈E, we have e⪯e′ if and only if there exists
a directed path in N whose first edge is e and whose last edge is e′.
Since N is a directed and acyclic graph, ⪯ is well defined. Such partial
order can be extended to a total order on E
(see [30, Section 22]). Throughout this paper, we fix such an order extension
and denote it by ≤.
Remark 5.1.4**.**
The choice of the linear order ≤ will prevent ambiguities
in the interpretation of the objects associated with N.
None of the results in this paper depends on the specific choice of ≤.
5.2 Network Codes and Network Channels
As mentioned in Subsection 5.1, each intermediate vertex
of N applies some function to the incoming packets,
and transmits the value of this function on the outgoing edges.
The collection of operations that the intermediate vertices perform
is called the network code.
Definition 5.2.1**.**
A network codeF for N is a family of functions {FV:V∈V∖(S∪T)}, where
[TABLE]
Assume A=Fqm for some prime power q and some integer m≥1. Then we say that F is
linear if for all vertices V∈V∖(S∪T)
there exists a ∣in(V)∣×∣out(V)∣ matrix LV over Fq
such that FV(x1,...,xr)=(y1,...,ys)
for all (x1,...,xr)∈(Fqm)r, where
r:=∣in(V)∣, s:=∣out(V)∣, and
[TABLE]
In other words, we require that the restriction of FV:A^r→As
to Ar=(Fqm)r is a function that returns linear combinations of the r
input vectors from Fqm.
When F is a linear network code and V∈V∖(S∪T), we sometimes denote the matrix LV simply by FV.
A collection of functions as in Definition 5.2.1 fully specifies the
operations performed by the vertices of N with no ambiguity, thanks to the
choice of the linear order ≤. Note that in this paper we do not require our network codes to be linear (the alphabet A may not even be of the form A=Fqm).
In the remainder of the section we define a series of deterministic channels
that are naturally induced by a network code
F for N.
Definition 5.2.2**.**
Let F be a network code for N, and let E′⊆E be a non-empty set of edges.
In an error-free context, by definition of network code, the values of the edges from E′ can be
expressed as function of the sources input x∈X=X1×⋯XN.
This defines a deterministic channel
[TABLE]
that associates to x∈X the alphabet packets observed over the edges in E′, ordered according to ≤.
Note that ΩF[S→E′](x)⊆A∣E′∣ is a set of cardinality one for all x∈X=X1×⋯XN.
Now assume that T∈T, and that E′ is a cut that separates all sources S1,...,SN from T. We will construct a deterministic channel that describes the transfer from the edges in E′ to the terminal T.
Recall from Poset Theory that e∈Ecoverse′∈E when e′\precneqe, and there is no e′′∈E with e′\precneqe′′\precneqe. We recursively define the sets of edges
[TABLE]
For all k∈N, Ek+1′ is the union of E′∩Ek′ and the set of network edges
that immediately precede the edges in Ek′∖E′.
Let k:=min{k∈N:Ek′⊆E′}, where the minimum is well defined
by property (G) of Definition 5.1.1 and the fact that E′ is a cut that separates S and T.
For all 0≤k≤k−1, the values of the edges in Ek′ can be expressed, via the network code F, as
a function of the values of the edges in Ek+1′. This defines k functions
ΨF[k]:A^∣Ek+1∣→A∣Ek∣,
for 0≤k≤k−1
(see also the following Example 5.2.3). Note that we define ΨF[k] to be the identity on the edges in the set Ek′∩Ek+1′. Now the
composition
Ψ:=ΨF[k−1]∘⋯∘ΨF[1]∘ΨF[0]
expresses the values of the edges of in(T) as a function of the values of the
edges from Ek′⊆E′. We trivially
extend Ψ to a function
[TABLE]
that expresses the values of the edges from in(T) as a function of the values of the
edges from the edge-cut E′ (by “trivially” we mean that the value of the edges from E′∖Ek′ play no role in the definition of Ψ). This induces
a deterministic channel denoted by
[TABLE]
Example 5.2.3**.**
Let N be the network in Figure 3. The edges
of N are ordered according to their indices. The set
E′:={e2,e5} is an edge-cut between S={S} and T.
The edges in E′ are represented by a
dashed arrow in Figure 3. Fix a network code F for N.
Following the notation of Definition 5.2.2, we have
E0′=in(T)={e6,e7}, E1′={e4,e5}, and E2′={e2,e5}=E′.
Hence k=2. The functions ΨF[0] and ΨF[1] are as follows:
[TABLE]
for all (x4,x5)∈A^∣E1′∣=A^2 and (x1,x5)∈A^∣E2′∣=A^2, and
where FV1′′(x2) is the second component of the vector FV1(x2)∈A2.
Now observe that (ΨF[1]∘ΨF[0])(x2,x5)=FV3(FV1′′(x2),x5)∈A2
for all (x2,x5)∈A^2,
which expresses the values of the edges of in(T) as a function of the values of the edges of E′. Therefore one has
ΩF[E′→in(T)](x2,x5)={FV3(FV1′′(x2),x5)}⊆A2 for all (x2,x5)∈A^2.
Remark 5.2.4**.**
The deterministic channels introduced in Definition 5.2.2 are well defined for any
edge-cut E′ that separates the network sources from T. In particular, we do not require E′ to be a minimum
cut or an antichain cut (i.e., a cut where every two distinct edges are not comparable with respect to the order ⪯).
For example, the cut E′ of Example 5.2.3 is not an antichain,
as e2⪯e5. Observe moreover that whenever
E′ is a non-antichain cut,
the channel ΩF[E′→in(T)] automatically gives “priority” to the edges in E′ that are
“closer” to the destination T in the network topology.
The specific definition of the channel
ΩF[E′→in(T)] makes it so
that all the results of this paper (such as decomposition results and upper bounds) also hold for edge-cuts that do not form
an antichain with respect to ⪯. This is different, e.g., from the general approach of [2],
where some of the cut-set bounds are derived only for the special case of antichain edge-cuts (see
in particular [1, Theorem 3]).
Remark 5.2.5**.**
If T∈T and
E′ is a cut between S and T, then the channel describing the transfer
from S to T
factors through the cut E′, i.e., we have
[TABLE]
Notice that for a non-antichain cut E′ the above channel decomposition does not simply follow
from the fact that E′ is a cut between S and in(T), and
heavily relies on the specific
construction of the channel
ΩF[E′→in(T)] given in Definition 5.2.2.
Example 5.2.6**.**
Following the notation of Example 5.2.3, it is easy to see that
for all (x1,x2)∈A2
we have
ΩF[S→E′](x1,x2)={(x2,FV2(x1,FV1′(x2)))},
where FV1′(x2) is the first component of FV1(x2)∈A2.
Using the expression for ΩF[E′→in(T)] found in Example 5.2.3 we obtain
[TABLE]
which expresses the values of the edges from in(T) as a function of the values
of the source edges.
We now examine channels that are obtained by “freezing”
the packets emitted by some of the network sources.
These deterministic channels
will play an important role in the study of the capacity region of adversarial networks
in Section 6.
Definition 5.2.7**.**
Let F be a network code for N, and let J⊊I be
a proper non-empty subset of source indices.
Fix an element x∈∏i∈I∖JXi, and
let E′⊆E be non-empty. We denote by
[TABLE]
the deterministic channel that associates to an input x∈∏i∈JXi
the values of the edges from E′ when
the sources in SJ emit the corresponding packets from x∈∏i∈JXi, and
the sources in SI∖J emit the corresponding (fixed) packets
from x∈∏i∈I∖JXi.
Let T∈T be a terminal, and let E′ be a cut that separates SJ from T. Reasoning as in Definition 5.2.2, it is easy to see that
the values of the
edges from in(T) can be expressed, given the network code F, as a function of the
values of the edges from E′ and by x.
This defines a deterministic channel
[TABLE]
Remark 5.2.8**.**
The channel describing the transfer from SJ to T, given the
input x, again factors through any cut
E′ between SJ and T, i.e.,
[TABLE]
5.3 Network Adversaries
We now model combinatorially an adversary capable of corrupting the values
of the edges of N, or erase them, according to certain restrictions.
We denote such an adversary by A, and call the pair (N,A)
an adversarial network. The vertices still process the
incoming packets using a network code F.
We start by defining some adversarial analogues of the deterministic channels
introduced in Definitions 5.2.2 and 5.2.7.
Definition 5.3.1**.**
Let F be a network code for N, and let T∈T be a terminal.
We denote by
[TABLE]
the channel that associates to an input x∈∏i∈IXi the variety
of packets that can be observed over the edges of in(T) in the presence of the adversary
A. Similarly, when J⊆I is a non-empty subset of source indices, we denote by
[TABLE]
the channel that associates to x∈∏i∈JXi
the variety of packets that can be observed over the edges from E′ when, in the presence of the adversary A, the sources in SJ emit the corresponding packets from x∈∏i∈JXi, and the sources in SI∖J emit the corresponding (fixed) packets
from x∈∏i∈I∖JXi.
Clearly, the adversarial channels introduced in
Definition 5.3.1
are not deterministic in general.
Example 5.3.2**.**
Let N be the network depicted in
Figure 4. We order the edges
of N according to their indices. The input alphabet is
X=X1×X2=A2×A.
A network code F for N is the assignment of a function
FV:A^2×A^→A4.
Consider an adversary A able to erase at most one of the
values of the dotted edges
of N, i.e., {e4,e6,e7}. This scenario is modeled by a
channel ΩF[A;S→in(T)]:A2×A⇢A^4. We can describe this channel as follows. If (x1,x2,x3)∈A2×A and z:=FV(x1,x2,x3)∈A4, then
[TABLE]
where ω⋆ is the erasure weight of
Definition 4.1.2.
Now let J:={1}, and assume that S2 emits a fixed element
x3∈A. The channel ΩFJ[A;SJ→in(T)∣x3] is as follows.
If (x1,x2)∈A2, and z:=FV(x1,x2,x3)∈A4,
then ΩFJ[A;S→in(T)](x1,x2)={y∈A^4:y2=z2\mboxandω⋆(y;{1,2,3,4})≤1}.
We conclude this subsection by introducing
a general class of network adversaries, acting on sets of edges
with limited error and erasure power.
Notation 5.3.3**.**
Let U⊆E be a set of network edges, and let t,e≥0 be
integers. We denote by At,e⟨U⟩
an adversary having access only to edges from U, being able to erase
up to e of them, and change the values of up to t of them with different
symbols from A.
Let L≥1 be an integer, and let U1,...,UL⊆E be pairwise
disjoint subsets of network edges. Let t1,...,tL
and e1,...,eL be non-negative integers.
Define the L-tuples U:=(U1,...,UL), t:=(t1,...,tL) and e:=(e1,...,eL).
We denote by At,e⟨U⟩ the adversary representing the scenario where all the
Atℓ,eℓ⟨Uℓ⟩’s act simultaneously on the network, possibly with coordination.
5.4 Capacity Regions of Adversarial Networks
In this section, in analogy with the theory of point-to-point adversarial channels,
we propose definitions of one-shot, zero-error, and
compound zero-error capacity regions
of adversarial networks.
The one-shot capacity region, as the name suggests,
measures the number of alphabet symbols that the sources can
multicast to all terminals in a single use of the network.
The zero-error capacity region measures the average number
of packets that can be multicasted to the terminals per network use, in the limit
where the number of uses goes to infinity. Finally, the compound
zero-error capacity regions measures the average number
of packets that can be multicasted to the terminals per network use, in the limit
where the number of uses goes to infinity, and in the scenario where the adversary
is forced to operate on the same (unknown) set of edges in every network use.
Remark 5.4.1**.**
A definition of capacity region was proposed in [23, Section IV] in the context of
adversarial random network coding. The definition of [23] is probabilistic,
and best suited to study random linear approaches to multicast.
In particular, it
does not coincide with the notion of capacity originally proposed in [2]
for single-source adversarial networks (see, e.g., [2, Theorem 1]).
Inspired by the work of Shannon [24], our approach to adversarial
network channels has a
combinatorial flavor, rather than a probabilistic one.
As a consequence, the three notions of capacity region introduced in this paper
are all different from the one proposed in [23], and thus require
an independent analysis.
Definition 5.4.2**.**
The (one shot) capacity region of (N,A) is
the set R1(N,A) of all the
N-tuples (α1,...,αN)∈R≥0N for which
there exist a network code
F for N and non-empty
sets Ci⊆Xi, for 1≤i≤N, with the following properties:
log∣A∣∣Ci∣=αi,
2. 2.
C=C1×⋯×CN is good
for each channel ΩF[A;S→in(T)], T∈T.
We say that such a pair (F,C)achieves the rate(α1,...,αN) in one shot.
The conditions in Definition 5.4.2 guarantee that the
sources can transmit in one shot to each of the sinks
α1+⋯+αN alphabet symbols, αi of which are emitted
by Si, for 1≤i≤N. Note that the code C is
by definition a cartesian product. This models the scenario where
the sources cannot coordinate.
Remark 5.4.3**.**
Let n≥1 be an integer. The n-th cartesian power
Xn=(X1×⋯×XN)n
can be naturally identified with the set X1n×⋯×XNn. Therefore if T∈T and F1,...,Fn are network codes for
N, we can see a product channel of the form
∏k=1nΩFk[A;S→in(T)] as a channel
[TABLE]
We now introduce the zero-error capacity region.
Definition 5.4.4**.**
The zero-error capacity region of (N,A) is the
closure R0(N,A) of the set R0(N,A) of all the
N-tuples (α1,...,αN)∈R≥0N for which there exist:
•
an integer n≥1,
•
network codes F1,...,Fn for N,
•
non-empty sets Ci⊆Xin, for 1≤i≤N,
with the following properties:
log∣A∣∣Ci∣=n⋅αi,
2. 2.
C=C1×⋯×CN is good
for each channel
\displaystyle\prod_{k=1}^{n}\Omega_{\mathcal{F}^{k}}[\textnormal{{A}};{\bf S}\to\textnormal{in}(T)],\mbox{T\in{\bf T}}, in the sense of (4).
Remark 5.4.5**.**
When the network vertices operate in a memoryless way (as in our setup) or, more generally, in a causal way, then
doubling the length of the network messages
(i.e., assuming that the alphabet is
A×A instead of A)
does not model two uses of the network, as the following example shows.
More generally, taking the n-th power of the
the network alphabet does not model n network uses.
As a consequence, the zero-error capacity region is not the same as
the one-shot capacity region, in the limit where
the “length” of the network alphabet goes to infinity.
These two capacity concepts are different in general, and require
independent analyses.
Example 5.4.6**.**
Let N be the network in Figure 5, and let A:=F2 be the network alphabet.
The edges are ordered according to their indices. Consider an adversary on N
who can only operate on the edges from
E′={e3,e4,e5,e6} by possibly corrupting the value of one of these edges.
The action of the adversary is described by the channel
H:F24⇢F24 of Examples 2.1.5 and 2.2.5, given by
H(x)={y∈F24:dH(y,x)≤1}
for all x∈F24.
Observe that a network code for N is the assignment of a function
FV:F22→F24, as erasures are excluded from the model.
Assume that the network is used twice, with network codes
F1 and F2 in the first and second channel use, respectively.
The channel describing the two uses of the network is the product channel
[TABLE]
Note that for all x=(x1,x2,x3,x4)∈F22×F22 we have
Ω1(x)=H2(FV1(x1,x2),FV2(x3,x4)).
We will show that C1(Ω1)<log25.
Assume by contradiction that there exists a code C⊆F22×F22
with ∣C∣=5 and which is good for Ω1. Then
C:={(FV1(x1,x2),FV2(x3,x4)):x=(x1,x2,x3,x4)∈C}⊆F24×F24
is a good code for the channel H2 of cardinality five. Since ∣C∣=5, there must exist x,x′∈C with
x=x′ and (x1,x2)=(x1′,x2′). Therefore C⊆F24×F24 is a good code for
H2 of cardinality five which has two distinct codewords that coincide in the first four components. However, as shown in Example 2.2.5, there is no such a code.
Thus C1(Ω1)<log25, as claimed.
Now assume that the edges can carry symbols from F2×F2.
Using Example 2.2.5 one can show that there exists a function
FV:F22×F22→F24×F24 such that
Ω2:=ΩF[S→E′]\RHDH2:F22×F22⇢F24×F24
has capacity C1(Ω2)≥log25. Therefore
C1(Ω2)>C1(Ω1).
We now focus on composite adversaries of type At,e⟨U⟩, where
L≥1, and U, t and e are as in Notation 5.3.3.
Consider the scenario where the network N is used multiple times, and
where the L network adversaries At1,e1⟨U1⟩,...,AtL,eL⟨UL⟩
defining At,e⟨U⟩ are
forced to operate on the same set of edges in each use of the network. In analogy with
Definition 4.2.2, this scenario naturally motivates the following definition.
Definition 5.4.7**.**
Let L≥1, U, t and e be as in Notation 5.3.3,
and assume A=At,e⟨U⟩.
The compound zero-error capacity region of (N,A) is the
closure R0,cp(N,A) of the set
R0,cp(N,A) of all the
N-tuples (α1,...,αN)∈R≥0N for which there exist:
•
an integer n≥1,
•
network codes F1,...,Fn for N,
•
non-empty sets Ci⊆Xin, for 1≤i≤N,
with the following properties:
log∣A∣∣Ci∣=n⋅αi,
2. 2.
C=C1×⋯×CN is good
for each channel
\displaystyle\bigcup_{\begin{subarray}{c}\bm{\mathcal{V}}\subseteq\bm{\mathcal{U}}\\
|\bm{\mathcal{V}}|\leq\bm{t}+\bm{e}\end{subarray}}\prod_{k=1}^{n}\Omega_{\mathcal{F}^{k}}[\textnormal{{A}}_{\bm{t},\bm{e}}\langle\bm{\mathcal{V}}\rangle;{\bf S}\to\textnormal{in}(T)],\,\mbox{T\in{\bf T}}.
Remark 5.4.8**.**
It follows from the definitions that R(N,A)⊆R0(N,A)⊆R0(N,A) for any adversary A.
Moreover, if A is of the form A=At,e⟨U⟩, then
R0(N,A)⊆R0,cp(N,A).
In particular, we have
R0(N,A)⊆R0,cp(N,A).
This property formalizes the fact that, in the compound model, the adversaries are forced to operate on the same edges in each channel use, and therefore their power is possibly reduced.
6 Porting Bounds for Hamming-Type Channels to Networks
In this section we show how the properties of channel products, concatenations and unions
established in Section 3 can be combined with each other to obtain
upper bounds for the three capacity regions of an adversarial network.
The idea behind our approach is to derive cut-set bounds by porting, in
a systematic manner, upper bounds for the three capacities of Hamming-type
channels to networks.
Notation 6.0.1**.**
In the sequel we follow the notation of Section 5, and
fix a network N=(V,E,S,T)
with alphabet A.
The sources
are S={S1,...,SN}, and I={1,...,N} is the set of source indices. The
alphabet of source Si is Xi:=A∣out(Si)∣, for
1≤i≤N, and X:=X1×⋯×XN.
We work with a generic adversary
A and a fixed linear extension ≤
of the network partial order ⪯.
6.1 Method Description
Suppose that we are interested in describing the one-shot capacity region
R(N,A)⊆R≥0N of (N,A). Let
(α1,...,αN)∈R(N,A) be arbitrary. By Definition 5.4.2,
there exist a network code F for N
and a code C=C1×⋯×CN⊆X1×⋯×XN such that
(F,C) achieves (α1,...,αN) in one shot.
Let J⊊I be a non-empty subset of source indices, and let
T∈T be a terminal. Take a cut E′⊆E that separates SJ
from T, and fix an element x∈∏i∈I∖JCi.
Assume for the moment that there is no adversary A. As observed in Remark 5.2.8, the channel
ΩFJ[SJ→in(T)∣x] decomposes as
follows:
[TABLE]
Denote
by Id[E′→E′]:A∣E′∣⇢A^∣E′∣ the
identity channel (see Example 2.1.4),
and observe that equation (5) can be trivially re-written as
[TABLE]
We now let the adversary A act only on the cut E′,
and assume that its action on the edges of E′ can be described by a channel
Ω[A;E′→E′]:A∣E′∣⇢A^∣E′∣.
For example, if A was originally able to corrupt
the values of up to t edges of N, we now consider the scenario
where A can corrupt up to t edges from E′.
This action is described by the Hamming-type channel
Ht,0⟨U⟩:A∣E′∣⇢A^∣E′∣ introduced in Definition
4.1.3, with s:=∣E′∣ and U:=[s]={1,...,s}.
Therefore we can simply take
Ω[A;E′→E′]:=Ht,0⟨U⟩ in this case.
Going back to our general discussion, observe that letting the adversary A
operate only on E′ replaces the channel Id[E′→E′] in (6)
with the channel Ω[A;E′→E′]. This defines
a new channel
[TABLE]
whose decomposition is graphically represented in Figure 6, for a fixed x.
Note that ΩFJ[A;SJ→in(T)∣x] is finer than
ΩFJ[A;SJ→in(T)∣x], as in the former channel
the action of the adversary was restricted to E′. In symbols (see Definition 2.1.6) we have
[TABLE]
Now observe that the code
∏i∈JCi is good for the channel
ΩFJ[A;SJ→in(T)∣x].
Indeed,
∏i∈ICi is a good code for
ΩF[A;S→in(T)] by definition of one-shot capacity region,
and x∈∏i∈I∖JCi.
Using (8), we see that ∏i∈JCi is good for the channel
ΩFJ[A;SJ→in(T)∣x] as well. In particular,
[TABLE]
where C1 denotes the one-shot capacity (expressed as a logarithm in base ∣A∣), and the last inequality follows combining equation
(7) and Proposition 3.1.5.
We therefore obtained in (9) an upper-bound for the capacity region
R(N,A) in terms of the capacity
of the intermediate channel Ω[A;E′→E′]:A∣E′∣⇢A^∣E′∣, which does not depend on the specific choice of the network code
F.
A similar (and in fact easier) argument can be given for the case J=I, i.e., when all sources are considered. In that case there is no x to select.
Example 6.1.1**.**
Let N be the network in Figure 7. The edges
of N are ordered according to their indices.
We consider an adversary A who can corrupt
up to one packet from the dotted edges, i.e., from U:={e1,e4,e6,e7}.
Therefore A=A1,0⟨U⟩ according to Notation 5.3.3
(erasures are excluded
from the model). Let (α1,α2)∈R(N,A)
be arbitrary.
Take J={1}.
The set E′={e4,e5,e6,e7} is a cut between S1 and T.
Let U:={1,3,4}, and let
H1,0⟨U⟩ denote the channel introduced in Definition
4.1.3. Using (9) we obtain
α1≤C1(H1,0⟨U⟩), and by
Theorem 4.3.1 we have
C1(H1,0⟨U⟩)≤4−2⋅1=2. Therefore
α1≤2.
Reasoning in the same way with the cut
E′={e1,e2}, one obtains a better bound for α1, i.e.,
α1≤1.
Taking J={2} and J={1,2}, and combining in the same way (9) and
Theorem 4.3.1, we obtain
α2≤1 and
α1+α2≤2. Therefore
R(N,A)⊆{(α1,α2)∈R≥02:α1≤1,α2≤2,α1+α2≤1}.
6.2 Porting Lemmas
We now establish two general lemmas that formalize the argument presented
in Subsection 6.1, and extend it to the zero-error and to the compound
zero-error capacity regions. Note that these extensions do not directly
follow from the discussion in the previous
subsection, and heavily rely on the properties of channel concatenation and union established in
Section 3. We start with the Porting Lemma for the one-shot and the zero-error capacity.
Lemma 6.2.1**.**
Let {Ω[A;E′→E′]:E′⊆E,E′=∅}
be a family of adversarial channels such that
Ω[A;E′→E′]:A∣E′∣⇢A^∣E′∣ for all E′.
Assume that for all network codes F for N:
•
ΩF[A;S→in(T)]≤ΩF[S→E′]\RHDΩ[A;E′→E′]\RHDΩF[E′→in(T)]
for all T∈T and for all cuts E′⊆E that separate S from T;
•
ΩFJ[A;SJ→in(T)∣x]≤ΩFJ[SJ→E′∣x]\RHDΩ[A;E′→E′]\RHDΩFJ[E′→in(T)∣x] for all non-empty J⊊I, all cuts
E′⊆E that separate SJ from T, and all
x∈∏i∈I∖JXi.
The following hold.
For all (α1,...,αN)∈R(N,A) and
for all non-empty subset J⊆I we have
[TABLE]
2. 2.
For all (α1,...,αN)∈R0(N,A)
and for all non-empty subset J⊆I we have
[TABLE]
Proof.
We only show the two properties for J⊊I.
The proof for the case J=I is similar and easier.
Part 1 was essentially already shown in Subsection 6.1.
More precisely, the bound in (10) follows from (9) by minimizing over all
T∈T and E′.
Let us show part 2. Since the inequalities in
(\refregion2) define a closed set in RN, it suffices to
show the result for R0(N,A). Fix an arbitrary
(α1,...,αN)∈R0(N,A). Let
n≥1, F1,...,Fn and C=C1×⋯×CN⊆X1n×⋯×XNn
be as in Definition 5.4.4. Take an element
[TABLE]
Let T∈T be a terminal, and let E′ be a cut that
separates SJ from T.
To simplify the notation throughout the proof, for all 1≤k≤n define
[TABLE]
We can now apply Corollary
3.1.7 to equation (12), and obtain
[TABLE]
By assumption, we have ΩFkJ[A;SJ→T]≥ΩFkJ[A;SJ→T] for all 1≤k≤n. Combining
this with equation (13) we deduce
[TABLE]
Since, by definition of R0(N,A), the code C is good for
∏k=1nΩFk[A;S→T], the code
∏i∈JCi is good for
∏k=1nΩFkJ[A;SJ→T].
Thus by Proposition 3.1.5 we conclude that
[TABLE]
The final result can be obtained by minimizing over all T∈T and E′.
∎
In the remainder of the section we establish an analogous porting lemma
for the compound zero-error capacity. We start by defining Hamming-type channels
associated with an adversary of type
A=At,e⟨U⟩.
Definition 6.2.2**.**
Let L≥1, U, t and e be as in
Notation 5.3.3, and let V=(V1,...,VL)⊆U be arbitrary (possibly V=U).
Take a non-empty subset of edges E′⊆E, and set s:=∣E′∣.
Denote by e1<e2<⋯<es the edges in E, sorted
according to the linear order extension ≤. For all
1≤ℓ≤L, let Vℓ:={1≤i≤s:ei∈Uℓ}.
The channel Ht,e⟨V,E′⟩ is defined by
Ht,e⟨V,E′⟩:=Ht,e⟨V⟩:As⇢A^s,
where V:=(V1,...,VL) and Ht,e⟨V⟩ is the Hamming-type
channel introduced in Definition 4.1.5.
The channel Ht,e⟨V,E′⟩ can be interpreted as
the “projection” of the adversary At,e⟨V⟩ on
E′. In particular, note that E′ determines
the size of the input/output alphabets
of the channel Ht,e⟨V,E′⟩.
We can now state the Compound Porting Lemma.
Lemma 6.2.3**.**
Let U, t and e be as in
Notation 5.3.3, and assume that A=At,e⟨U⟩.
Then for all (α1,...,αN)∈R0,cp(N,A) and for all non-empty subset J⊆I we have
[TABLE]
Sketch of the proof.
We proceed as in the proof of Lemma 6.2.1.
Take
(α1,...,αN)∈R0,cp(N,A), and let
n≥1, F1,...,Fn and C=C1×⋯×CN⊆X1n×⋯×XNn be as in Definition 5.4.7.
Fix any element
x=(x1,...,xn)∈∏i∈I∖JCi.
Let T∈T be a terminal, and let E′ be a cut between SJ and T.
To simplify the notation throughout the proof, for V⊆U
and for 1≤k≤n we define
[TABLE]
Now observe that ΩFkJ[A⟨V⟩;SJ→T]≥ΩFkJ[A⟨V⟩;SJ→T] for all 1≤k≤n.
Thus combining equation (14), Corollary 3.1.7 and Proposition
3.2.2, we obtain
[TABLE]
As in the proof of Lemma 6.2.1, by Proposition 3.1.5 we conclude
[TABLE]
where the last inequality can be shown using the
definition of
Ht,e⟨V,E′⟩
(see Definition 6.2.2).
∎
7 Capacity Regions: Upper Bounds
In this section we apply the theoretical bounds established in Section 6
to concrete networking
contexts. Our results study one-shot models, zero-error models, and compound zero-error models.
Moreover, they cover several classes of network adversaries, including
multiple adversaries, restricted adversaries, different types of
error/erasure adversaries, and
rank-metric adversaries (see Section 9). The bounds presented in this section
do not follow in any obvious from known results in the context of network communications under
probabilistic error models.
We follow the notation of Section 5, and
work with a fixed network N=(V,E,S,T) over an alphabet A.
The network sources are S={S1,...,SN}, and I={1,...,N} is the set of source indices.
We let β be the parameter introduced in Notation 4.1.1.
Notation 7.0.1**.**
If J⊆I is a non-empty subset and T∈T is a terminal, we denote by
μ(SJ,T) the min-cut between SJ and T, i.e., the minimum size of an edge-cut that separates all the sources in SJ from T.
By the edge-connectivity version of Menger’s Theorem (see [31]), μ(SJ,T)
coincides with the maximum number of edge-disjoint directed paths connecting SJ to T.
Note moreover that, by property (E) of Definition 5.1.1, one has μ(SJ,T)≥1 for all non-empty J⊆I and for all T∈T.
7.1 One-Shot Capacity Region
We start by considering a single adversary A restricted to a set of edges U⊆E, with limited error and erasure powers. The following result shows that any bound from classical Coding Theory translates into a bound for the one-shot capacity region of
(N,A)
via the Porting Lemma.
Theorem 7.1.1**.**
Let U⊆E be a subset of edges, and let t,e≥0 be integers.
Assume A=At,e⟨U⟩. For all
(α1,...,αN)∈R(N,A) and for all non-empty J⊆I we have
[TABLE]
In particular, if U=E then for all
(α1,...,αN)∈R(N,A) and for all non-empty J⊆I we have
[TABLE]
Proof.
Combine Proposition 4.1.4 and part 1 of Lemma 6.2.1.
The second part of the statement follows from the fact that
β(A,u′,2t+e+1)≤β(A,u,2t+e+1) for all u≥u′≥1.
∎
Remark 7.1.2**.**
When U⊊E in Theorem 7.1.1, the second minimum in (15) is not realized, in general, by a
minimum cut E′ between SJ and T (examples can be easily found). Thus the topology of
the set U of “vulnerable” edges plays an important role in the evaluation of the bound in (15).
As special cases of Theorem 7.1.1, we obtain generalizations
of the Singleton-type and
Hamming-type bounds established in [2] for single-source networks. Note that any other
classical bound from Coding Theory can be ported to the networking context via Theorem 7.1.1, in the general case where the adversary is possibly restricted to operate on a subset U⊆E of vulnerable edges. Observe moreover that no extra property of the edge-cuts E′ is needed in Theorem 7.1.1. In particular, we do not require that the sets E′ are antichain cuts (see also Remark
5.2.4).
Corollary 7.1.3** (Singleton-type and Hamming-type bound).**
Let t,e≥0 be integers, and assume A=At,e⟨E⟩. Then for all
(α1,...,αN)∈R(N,A) and for all non-empty J⊆I we have
[TABLE]
and
[TABLE]
Proof.
The result can be shown by combining Theorem 7.1.1 and the well known Singleton bound and Hamming bound from classical Coding Theory (see [32] for a general reference). Note that the proofs of these two bounds do not require the alphabet A to be a finite field.
∎
Example 7.1.4**.**
Let N be the network in Figure 8. The edges are ordered according to their indices. Consider the adversary
A:=A1,0⟨E⟩ who can corrupt at most one of
the values of the edges from E.
Let A be the network alphabet, and let (α1,α2)∈R(N,A) be arbitrary.
Using the Singleton-Type bound of Corollary 7.1.3 with
I={1} we get α1≤1. Applying the same bound with
I={2} and I={1,2} one obtains, respectively, α2≤1 and
α1+α2≤2. Therefore
R(N,A)⊆{(α1,α2)∈R≥02:α1≤1,α2≤1,α1+α2≤2}
for any alphabet A.
Now assume A=F2. Applying in the same way the Hamming-Type bound we obtain
[TABLE]
Using the definition of one-shot capacity region (Definition 5.4.2), it is easy to see that (16) implies that
R(N,A)⊆{(0,0),(1,0),(0,1)} for A=F2.
Therefore for A=F2 the Hamming-Type Bound is better than the Singleton-type Bound.
7.2 Other Capacity Regions
We now consider multiple adversaries acting on pairwise disjoint sets of network edges, with different error and erasure powers. In this context, the three capacity regions defined in Subsection 5.4 can be upper-bounded by combining the Compound Porting Lemma with the results established in Section 4.
Theorem 7.2.1**.**
Fix an integer L≥1. Let U1,...,UL⊆E be pairwise disjoint subsets of edges, and let t1,...,tL≥0 and
e1,...,eL≥0 be non-negative integers. Define U:=(U1,...,UL),
t:=(t1,...,tL) and e:=(e1,...,eL), and assume
A=At,e⟨U⟩.
Then for all (α1,...,αN)∈R0,cp(N,A) and for all non-empty subset J⊆I we have
[TABLE]
In particular, the inequality in (17) holds for all non-empty J⊆I
and for any (α1,...,αN)∈R0(N,A) and
(α1,...,αN)∈R(N,A).
Proof.
It suffices to combine Theorem 4.3.1 and Lemma 6.2.3.
The second part of the statement follows from the fact that
R(N,A)⊆R0(N,A)⊆R0,cp(N,A),
as observed in Remark 5.4.8.
∎
We now show how to apply
Theorem 7.2.1 in a concrete example.
Example 7.2.2**.**
Let N be the network in Figure 9. The network edges are ordered according to their indices. We consider two adversaries associated
with the sets of edges U1={e5,e6,e7} and
U2={e1,e8,e9,e10,e11,e12}.
Both the adversaries have error power 1 and erasure power 0.
In our notation, the adversary is therefore A=At,e⟨U⟩,
where U=(U1,U2), t=(1,1) and e=(0,0).
We want to describe the three capacity regions of
(N,A). Let (α1,...,αN)∈R0,cp(N,A) be arbitrary.
Applying Theorem 7.2.1 with I={1} and E′={e1,e2} we obtain α1≤2−1=1. Using the same theorem with
I={2} and E′={e5,e6,e7,e8,e9,e10} we find
α2≤6−2−2=2. Finally, applying again Theorem 7.2.1
with I={1,2} and E′={e2,e5,e6,e7,e8,e9,e10} we obtain
α1+α2≤3.
Therefore by Remark 5.4.8 we deduce
[TABLE]
We now explicitly give a communication scheme
that achieves the rate (α1,α2)=(1,2) in one shot
for A=F5. It can be shown that such a scheme exists for
A=Fq whenever q≥4.
We start by assigning the network code functions. Since erasures
are excluded from the model, it suffices to assign functions
FV1:F53→F53 and FV2:F54→F52.
For all (x1,x3,x4)∈F53, define FV1(x1,x3,x4):=(x1+2x3+3x4,x3,x4). To define F2,
we first select any function f:F53→F5 with the following property:
for all (x5,x6,x7)∈F53 and x∈F5,
f(x5,x6,x7)=x if at least two among x5,x6,x7 equal x.
The function f is an arbitrary extension of a “majority vote” decoding function. Now for all
(x2,x5,x6,x7)∈F54 define FV2(x2,x5,x6,x7):=(x2+f(x5,x6,x7),2x2).
Let us construct the local codes C1⊆F52 and C2⊆F55 for the two sources
S1 and S2.
We take C1:={(a,3a):a∈F5} as code for source S1, and
C2:={(b,c,2b+c,2b+c,2b+c):(b,c)∈F5×F5} as code for source S2.
Note that log5∣C1∣=1=α1 and log5∣C2∣=2=α2.
It is easy to see that for any transmitted (a,3a)∈C1 and
(b,c,2b+c,2b+c,2b+c)∈C2,
terminal T observes over the incoming edges the vector
[TABLE]
where w∈F55 is a vector of Hamming weight at most 1. Note moreover that
[TABLE]
One can check that G is the generator matrix of a
code D⊆F55 of dimension 3
and minimum Hamming distance 3.
Thus T can recover a,b and c from (18) using a minimum distance decoder for D.
Theorem
7.2.1 implies the following corollary describing special types of adversaries.
Corollary 7.2.3**.**
Let t≥0 be an integer, and assume A=At,0⟨E⟩. For all
(α1,...,αN)∈R0,cp(N,A) and for all non-empty J⊆I we have
[TABLE]
In particular, if N is adversary-free then for all
(α1,...,αN)∈R0,cp(N,A) and all ∅=J⊆I we have
[TABLE]
Moreover, the two bounds above hold for all non-empty J⊆I
and for any (α1,...,αN)∈R0(N,A) and
(α1,...,αN)∈R(N,A).
We conclude this section studying the scenario where the network alphabet is of the form A=Bm, where
B is a finite set with ∣B∣≥2 and m≥2 is an integer.
Consider an adversary A who can erase up to e components and corrupt up to t components
of each edge of the network, where t,e≥0 are non-negative integers.
We denote such an adversary by At,e⟨B,m⟩.
Combining Theorem 4.4.3 and
Lemma 6.2.1 one easily obtains the following result.
Theorem 7.2.4**.**
Let t,e≥0 be non-negative integers, and assume
A=At,e⟨B,m⟩.
Then for all (α1,...,αN)∈R0(N,A) and for all non-empty subset J⊆I we have
[TABLE]
In particular, the inequality in (19) holds for all non-empty J⊆I
and for all (α1,...,αN)∈R(N,A).
8 Capacity Regions: Constructions
This section studies the achievability of some of the upper bounds established in
Section 7, both for one-shot and (compound) zero-error models.
We describe communication schemes that achieve any integer point of the capacity region
of certain adversarial networks, most of which are inspired by
previously proposed approaches (in particular, by [23] and [25]).
We also show that, for the case of restricted adversaries, linear network coding does not suffice in
general
to achieve every point in the capacity region of adversarial networks.
In the sequel we follow the notation of Section 7.
8.1 Adversary-Free Scenario
We start by investigating the adversary-free scenario, showing how in this case
the algebraic approach of [25] can be extended to achieve,
in one shot, any integer point in the rate region
described by the bound of Corollary 7.2.3, over sufficiently large fields.
Remark 8.1.1**.**
Let (a1,...,aN)∈NN be an integer vector that satisfies ∑i∈Jai≤minT∈Tμ(SJ,T)
for all ∅=J⊆I (cf. Corollary 7.2.3).
To show that (a1,...,aN) can be achieved in one shot in an adversary-free context, it does not suffice to
directly apply the approach of [25] to the network obtained
from N
by adding a super-source connected to all the sources S1,...,SN with a sufficiently large number of edges.
Indeed, this approach would only show that there exists a communication scheme that allows
the set of sources {S1,...,SN} to
transmit to all the terminals at a global rate of a1+a2+⋯+aN. However,
such a scheme does not necessarily allow
each source Si to transmit at the prescribed rate ai, for all i∈I. In other words, in the notation
of Definition 5.4.2, such a scheme does not necessarily induce a global code C for the sources that decomposes as a cartesian product, defining local codes C1,...,CN.
This issue can be solved by extending the algebraic approach
of [25] to multi-source networks via the following Graph Theory lemma.
Lemma 8.1.2**.**
Let (a1,...,aN)∈NN be an integer N-tuple such that
∑i∈Jai≤minT∈Tμ(SJ,T)
for all non-empty J⊆I.
Then for each terminal T∈T there exist a1+a2+⋯+aN edge-disjoint directed paths connecting
S={S1,...,SN} to T, ai of which originate in Si for all i∈I.
Proof.
We start by adding a vertex S∈/V to the digraph G:=(V,E). For all i∈I, connect S to Si
with exactly ai directed edges. This defines a new digraph G′:=(V′,E′). Fix any terminal T∈T.
By the edge-connectivity version of Menger’s Theorem,
it suffices to show that the minimum size of an edge-cut between S and T (in the graph G′) is a:=a1+a2+⋯+aN, i.e., that
μ(S,T)=a, where this time μ denotes the min-cut in the new graph G′.
It is clear that μ(S,T)≤a. Assume by contradiction that there exists a cut Γ⊆E′
with ∣Γ∣<a that separates S from T.
For all i∈I={1,...,N}, denote by Ei the set of directed edges connecting S to Si, and let ni:=∣Γ∩Ei∣. Since
Ei∩Ej=∅ for all i,j∈I with i=j, we have
[TABLE]
Moreover, for all i∈I one clearly has ni=∣Γ∩Ei∣≤∣Ei∣=ai. Define
J:={i∈I:ni<ai}⊆I.
If J=∅ then ai=ni for all i∈I. This contradicts (20). Now assume J=∅,
and observe that for all i∈J the cut Γ does not disconnect S from Si. Hence
Γ must be a cut between SJ and T. As a consequence, the set
Γ∖⋃i∈I∖JEi
is a cut between SJ and T. Therefore
[TABLE]
a contradiction. This concludes the proof.
∎
Lemma 8.1.2 can now be employed to extend the approach of [25] from one to multiple sources,
obtaining the following achievability result for adversary-free
networks.
Theorem 8.1.3**.**
Assume A=A0,0⟨E⟩. We have
[TABLE]
provided that A=Fq and q is sufficiently large. Moreover,
every integer rate vector (a1,...,aN) as above can be achieved in one shot employing
linear network coding.
Proof.
Let (a1,...,aN)∈NN be an integer vector such that
∑i∈Jai≤minT∈Tμ(SJ,T) for all ∅=J⊆I. By Lemma 8.1.2,
for each terminal T∈T there exist
a1+⋯+aN edge-disjoint paths connecting S to
T, of which ai originate in Si for all i∈I. Without loss of generality,
we may assume that there is neither an edge nor a vertex of N which is not on at least one
of these ∣T∣⋅(a1+⋯+aN) paths. In particular, source Si
has at least ai outgoing edges for all i∈I, and every terminal
T has exactly a:=a1+⋯+aN incoming edges
(we are using property (F) of Definition 5.1.1).
For all i∈I, we let the local code of source Si
to be of the form
Ci:={v⋅Ei:v∈Fqai},
where Ei is a matrix of size ai×∣out(Si)∣ over Fq to
be determined.
Since erasures are excluded from the model, to
construct a linear network code
F for N it suffices to assign
an (∣in(V)∣×∣out(V)∣)-matrix
FV over Fq for every V∈V∖(S∪T). See
Definition 5.2.1.
In analogy with [25], we introduce a variable for each entry of each of the matrices
Ei and FV, for i∈I and V∈V∖(S∪T). We denote these variables
by ζ1,...,ζM, and let ζ:=(ζ1,...,ζM).
In the sequel, the Ei’s and FV’s are denoted by
Ei(ζ) and FV(ζ), to stress the dependency on ζ.
An evaluation
ζ=(ζ1,...,ζM)∈FqM of the variables
induces matrices Ei(ζ), for i∈I, and a linear network code
F(ζ) for N. Moreover,
for all T∈T and for all
(x1,...,xN)∈Fqa1×⋯×FqaN we have
[TABLE]
for some a×a transfer matrix MT(ζ)
whose entries are polynomials in ζ1,...,ζM evaluated in
ζ. Note that the matrix MT(ζ) has size a×a by property (F) of Definition 5.1.1.
By definition of one-shot capacity region, to prove the theorem it suffices to show that,
for a large enough q,
there exists an evaluation ζ of the variables such that
each matrix MT(ζ), T∈T, is invertible. As in [25],
this fact follows
from the Sparse Zeros Lemma (see, e.g., [33, Lemma 1]) and the existence
of the routing solutions. The details of this part of the argument are left to the reader.
The invertibility of the
MT(ζ)’s implies that each
Ei(ζ), i∈I, is injective as a linear map.
This shows that log∣A∣∣Ci∣=ai for all i∈I,
defining local codes for the sources of the expected cardinalities.
∎
8.2 Single Error-Adversary With Access to All Edges
In this subsection we focus on adversaries
of the form A=At,0⟨E⟩, and show that every integer vector
(a1,...,aN)∈NN in the region described by Corollary 7.2.3 can be achieved in one shot,
provided that A=Fqm, and that q and m are sufficiently large. Our scheme is a simple modification of an idea from [23], in which the authors propose a scheme in the context of
random linear network coding.
Note that the following Theorem 8.2.1
cannot be directly obtained from classical results in the context of
network communications under probabilistic error/erasure models.
Theorem 8.2.1**.**
Let t≥0 be an integer, and assume A=At,0⟨E⟩. We have
[TABLE]
provided that A=Fqm, q is sufficiently large, and m=∏i∈I(ai+2t). Moreover,
every integer rate vector (a1,...,aN) as above can be achieved in one shot employing
linear network coding.
Proof.
We will show the theorem only for N=2 sources and in the case where, for any terminal T∈T,
we have μ(S1,T),μ(S2,T),μ(S,T)>2t.
Fix a pair (a1,a2)∈N2 with a1≤μ(S1,T)−2t,
a2≤μ(S2,T)−2t and a1+a2≤μ(S,T)−2t
for all T∈T.
Observe that a1≤μ(S1,T), a2+2t≤μ(S2,T), and
a1+(a2+2t)≤μ(S,T).
By Lemma 8.1.2,
for each T∈T there exist
a1+a2+2t edge-disjoint paths connecting S to
T, of which a1 originate in S1, and a2+2t originate in S2. Moreover,
as a1+2t≤μ(S1,T), there exist a1+2t edge-disjoint paths connecting S1 to
T. Without loss of generality,
we may assume that there is neither an edge nor a vertex of N which is not on at least one
of these ∣T∣⋅(a1+a2+2t+a1+2t)=∣T∣⋅(2a1+a2+4t) paths.
Finally, for ease of notation define:
[TABLE]
Before describing a communication scheme that achieves (a1,a2) in one shot, following [23]
we introduce some maps
needed in the sequel. Fix finite fields Fq⊆Fq1⊆Fq2 and bases
{β11,...,β1n1}, {β21,...,β2n2} for Fq1 and Fq2
over Fq and Fq1, respectively. We denote by φ1:Fq1→Fqn1×1
the Fq-isomorphism that expands an element of Fq1 over the basis
{β11,...,β1n1}. Similarly, we denote by φ2:Fq2→Fq1n2×1
the Fq1-isomorphism that expands an element of Fq2 over the basis
{β21,...,β2n2}. Extend the maps φ1 and φ2 entry-wise
to matrices or arbitrary size over Fq1 and Fq2, respectively.
Note that the entries of matrices are always expanded as column vectors.
We now describe the communication scheme. Set m:=n1n2, so that A=Fqn1n2
is the alphabet.
Let G1∈Fq1a1×n1 be the generator matrix
of a rank-metric code D1⊆Fq1n1 with
dimFq1(D1)=a1 and minimum rank distance 2t+1 over Fq
(see [34]).
Similarly, let G2∈Fq2a2×n2 be the generator matrix
of a rank-metric code D2⊆Fq2n2 with
dimFq2(D2)=a2 and minimum rank distance 2t+1 over Fq1.
Source S1 chooses an arbitrary matrix X1∈Fq1n2×a1, computes
X1G1∈Fq1n2×n1, and sends over the outgoing edges the columns of the matrix
φ1(X1G1)E1∈Fqn1n2×b1,
where E1∈Fqn1×b1 is a local encoding matrix to be determined. Source S2 chooses an arbitrary X2∈Fq21×a2, computes
X2G2∈Fq21×n2, and sends over the outgoing edges the columns of the matrix
φ1(φ2(X2G2))E2∈Fqn1n2×b2,
where E2∈Fqn2×b2 is another local encoding matrix that will be chosen later in the proof.
The vertices in
V∖(S∪T) process the incoming packets using a linear network code F. According to Definition 5.2.1,
we therefore need to assign to every V∈V∖(S∪T)
an ∣in(V)∣×∣out(V)∣ matrix FV over Fq (erasures are excluded from the model).
As in the proof of Theorem 8.1.3, we introduce a variable for each entry of each of the matrices
Ei and FV, for i∈{1,2} and V∈V∖(S∪T). We denote these variables
by ζ1,...,ζM, and let ζ:=(ζ1,...,ζM).
In the sequel, the Ei’s and FV’s are denoted by
Ei(ζ) and FV(ζ).
Note that an evaluation
ζ=(ζ1,...,ζM)∈FqM of the variables
induces matrices Ei(ζ), for i∈{1,2}, and a linear network code
F(ζ) for N. Moreover,
for all T∈T and for all
X1∈Fq1n2×a1 and X2∈Fq21×a2 we have
[TABLE]
where the packets are organized as column vectors,
and MT1(ζ), MT2(ζ) are the transfer matrices
from source S1 and S2, respectively, to the terminal T. These two matrices are well defined in the context of erasure-free linear network coding (see [23, Section VII.B]), and their entries are polynomials in ζ1,...,ζM evaluated in ζ. Note that the size of MTi(ζ)
is bi×∣in(T)∣, for all T∈T and i∈{1,2}.
Using the existence of routing solutions and the Sparse Zeros Lemma (e.g., [33, Lemma 1]),
it can be shown that there exists an evaluation ζ∈FqM of the variables
such that, for all T∈T, the matrices
[TABLE]
are both right-invertible (or equivalently full-rank), provided that q is sufficiently large (for details about the matrix AT(ζ), see the proof of [23, Lemma 2]). In the sequel we fix such an evaluation
ζ, and simply write E1, E2, F, MT1, MT2, AT, BT for
E1(ζ), E2(ζ), F(ζ), MT1(ζ), MT2(ζ), AT(ζ), BT(ζ).
The local codes for sources S1 and S2 are, respectively,
[TABLE]
where the network packets are again organized as column vectors.
Since the matrices in (21) are both full-rank, the matrices E1 and E2 are full-rank as well (and thus right-invertible). As a consequence, we have
∣C1∣=∣Fq1n2×a1∣=qma1 and
∣C2∣=∣Fq21×a2∣=qma2. Therefore it remains to prove that C1×C2 is good for
each channel ΩF[A;S→in(T)], T∈T. We will show this by explicitly giving a decoding
procedure. In the remainder of the proof the packets will be always organized as column vectors.
A given terminal T∈T receives
[TABLE]
where Z is an error matrix such that \mboxrkFq(ZT)≤t (see [15, Section IV] for details).
Applying φ1−1 to both sides of (22), and using the fact that such map is Fq-linear, the terminal computes
[TABLE]
Terminal T can now multiply on the right both members of the previous equality by the right-inverse of AT, which is a matrix over Fq1
denoted by AT−1,
and obtain
[TABLE]
Observe that
\mboxrkFq1(φ1−1(ZT)AT−1)≤\mboxrkFq1(φ1−1(ZT))≤\mboxrkFq(ZT)≤t,
where the second inequality follows from [23, Lemma 1].
Therefore T can delete the first a1 columns of (23), and recover
X2∈Fq21×a2 using a minimum rank-distance decoder for the code generated by G2.
Now T uses (22) and computes
[TABLE]
By our choice of ζ, BT is a right-invertible matrix over Fq, whose right-inverse is denoted by
BT−1. Multiplying on the right both sides of (24) by BT−1, the terminal obtains
[TABLE]
Define X:=φ1(X1G1) and ZT:=ZTBT−1. Organize
the n1n2 rows of X and ZT in n2 blocks of n1 rows, and re-write
(25) as
[TABLE]
Since \mboxrkFq(ZT)≤t, we have \mboxrkFq(ZTi)≤t
for all 1≤i≤n2. Moreover, φ1,
Xi=φ1(X1iG1), where
X1i is the i-th row of X1. Therefore T can recover X by applying n2 times a
minimum rank-distance decoder for the code generated by G1. Clearly, this allows T to recover X1 as well.
∎
8.3 A Scheme for the Compound Model
In this subsection we adapt the scheme of Theorem 8.2.1 to
the compound model, i.e., to the scenario where the adversary is forced to act on the
same set of edges in each network use. We show that, in this specific context, the use of long network packets can be avoided by
employing
the network multiple times. Note that this fact does not follow
directly from Theorem 8.2.1, as a network alphabet
of the form Fqm does not model m uses of the network
(see Remark 5.4.5). In fact, our scheme does not
work if the adversary can act on a different set of edges in each channel use.
Theorem 8.3.1**.**
Let t≥0 be an integer, and assume A=At,0⟨E⟩. We have
[TABLE]
provided that A=Fqm, q is sufficiently large, and m:=min{ai:i∈I,ai=0}+2t. Moreover,
every integer rate vector (a1,...,aN) as above can be achieved using
linear network coding.
Proof.
As for Theorem 8.2.1, we show the result only for N=2 sources and in the case where,
for any T∈T,
we have μ(S1,T),μ(S2,T),μ(S,T)>2t. Assume a1≤a2 without loss of generality.
In the sequel we follow the notation
of the proof of Theorem 8.2.1, and modify the scheme to achieve (a1,a2) in
n2 channel uses, provided that A=Fqn1 and q is sufficiently large.
In every network use, each intermediate vertex V∈V∖(S∪T) processes the incoming packets according to
the network code F constructed in the proof of Theorem 8.2.1 (thus F is the same in every network use).
After choosing X1 and X2, sources S1 and S2 compute
φ1(X1G1),φ1(φ2(X2G2))∈Fqn1n2×n1, respectively.
The rows of these matrices are then organized in n2 blocks of
n1 rows:
[TABLE]
In the j-th network use, Si sends over the outgoing edges the columns of
Y1jEi∈Fqn1×bi, for 1≤j≤n2 and i∈{1,2}.
This defines codes C1, C2 for S1 and S2 of cardinality
qn1n2a1 and qn1n2a2, respectively.
The decoding is as follows. In the j-th network use, terminal T∈T
collects packets from Fqn1 over the incoming edges, and organizes them as the columns of a
n1×∣in(T)∣ matrix over Fq, which is denoted by RTj.
Observe that
RTj=Y1jE1MT1+Y2jE2MT2+ZTj,
where ZTj is the error matrix. Recall that ZTj is defined by ZTj:=WjUT, where
Wj∈Fqn1×∣E∣ is the matrix whose columns are the error packets, and
UT is the ∣E∣×∣in(T)∣ transfer matrix from the edges of N to the destination T.
Note that UT is well defined in the context
of erasure-free linear network coding
(see [15, Section I and IV] for details).
After n2 channel uses, terminal T constructs the matrix
[TABLE]
Now observe that ZT can be written as
[TABLE]
Since the adversary acts on the same edges in each network use, the matrix W has at most t non-zero columns, which implies
\mboxrkFq(ZT)≤\mboxrkFq(W)≤t (this fact would not be true if the adversary was able to act on a different set
of edges in each use of the channel). Decoding can therefore be completed starting from equation (26) as in the proof of
Theorem 8.2.1 (cf. equation (22)).
∎
8.4 Product Network Alphabets
Throughout this subsection we assume that A=Bm is a product alphabet, where
B is a finite set with ∣B∣≥2 and m≥2 is a fixed integer. The following theorem describes a capacity-achieving scheme for adversarial networks of the form (N,A),
where A=At,e⟨B,m⟩ is the adversary
of Theorem 7.2.4.
Theorem 8.4.1**.**
Let t,e≥0 be integers, and let A=At,e⟨B,m⟩. Assume m≥2t+e+1, and let k:=m−2t−e. Then
[TABLE]
provided that B=Fq and q is sufficiently large.
Proof.
Let (a1,...,aN)∈NN be an integer vector such that
∑i∈Jai≤minT∈Tμ(SJ,T) for all non-empty J⊆I.
By Lemma 8.1.2,
for each terminal T∈T there exist
a1+⋯+aN edge-disjoint paths connecting S to
T, of which ai originate in Si for all i∈I. Without loss of generality,
we may assume that there is neither an edge nor a vertex of N which is not on at least one
of these paths.
Moreover, we let Ei(ζ) and
FV(ζ), for i∈I and V∈V∖(S∪T), be as in the proof of
Theorem 8.1.3.
We will give a communication scheme (and therefore construct a pair (F,C)) that achieves
the rate
k/m⋅(a1,...,aN) in one shot.
Let
D⊆Fqm be a code of cardinality qk and minimum Hamming distance d=2t+e+1.
Let Enc:Fqk→Fqm and Dec:(Fq∪{⋆})m→Fqk
be an encoder and a decoder for D, respectively.
For all i∈I, let bi:=∣out(Si)∣. Source Si chooses xi=(xi,1,...,xi,ai)∈(Fqk)ai,
computes
[TABLE]
and sends Enc(yi,1),...,Enc(yi,bi)∈Fqm over the outgoing edges. Since the Ei(ζ)’s are injective as linear maps
(see the proof of Theorem 8.1.3), this defines local codes
C1,...,CN for the sources with Ci⊆(Fqm)bi and
log∣A∣∣Ci∣=logqmqkai=k/m⋅ai, for all
i∈I.
Let V∈V∖(S∪T) be a vertex, and set
r:=∣in(V)∣, s:=∣out(V)∣ for ease of notation. The vertex V collects x1,...,xr∈(Fq∪{⋆})m over the incoming edges, and computes
[TABLE]
The vectors Enc(y1),...,Enc(ys)∈Fqm are then sent over the outgoing edges of V.
This defines a network code F for N via
FV:(x1,...,xr)↦(Enc(y1),...,Enc(ys)), following the notation above.
It is easy to see that
the pair (F,C1×⋯×CN) achieves the rate
k/m⋅(a1,...,aN) in one shot.
∎
8.5 Linear and Non-Linear Network Coding
Theorem 8.2.1 shows that linear network coding suffices to achieve any integer point in the capacity region of an adversarial network of the form (N,At,0⟨E⟩), provided
that the network alphabet is of the form Fqm, with q and m sufficiently large.
We now show that this is not the case in general
if the adversary has the form A=At,0⟨U⟩, where
U⊊E is a proper subset of vulnerable edges.
Example 8.5.1**.**
Let N be the network in Figure 10. The edges
of N are ordered according to their indices.
Let U:={e1,e2,e3}⊊E and A:=A1,0⟨U⟩.
It is easy to see that 1∈R(N,A) for any network alphabet A.
We now show that the rate 1 cannot be achieved employing a linear network code at the intermediate vertex V.
Assume that A=Fqm for some prime power q and some m≥1, and that the vertex
V processes the incoming packets according to a linear network code FV:A3→A
(erasures are excluded from the model). By definition of linear network code (Definition 5.2.1),
there exist λ1,λ2,λ3∈Fq such that
FV(x)=λ1x1+λ2x2+λ3x3 for all
x=(x1,x2,x3)∈A3. Moreover, by definition of A we have
[TABLE]
Assume by contradiction that there exists a good code C⊆A3 for the channel ΩF[A;S→in(T)] with
∣C∣=∣A∣=qm≥2. Then at least one among λ1,λ2,λ3 must be non-zero.
Without loss of generality, we may assume
λ1=0. Let x,x′∈C with x=x′, and define
[TABLE]
Then
0=λ1y1+λ2y2+λ3y3=λ1y1′+λ2y2′+λ3y3′∈ΩF[A;S→in(T)](x)∩ΩF[A;S→in(T)](x′),
contradicting the fact that C is good for the channel ΩF[A;S→in(T)].
9 Other Adversarial Models
Using the combinatorial framework developed in this work, other adversarial
models can be investigated. As already shown for certain of
adversaries, Lemma 6.2.1 and 6.2.3 allow to port to
the network context any upper bound for the capacity of channels of the form
As⇢A^s. We include the analysis of
error-adversaries having access to overlapping sets of coordinates, and of
rank-metric adversaries. See [35, 36] for a general reference on
rank-metric codes in matrix representation.
In the sequel we only consider erasure-free adversarial models, and study the capacities
of certain channels of the form As⇢As, where
A is a finite set with ∣A∣≥2 and s≥1. All the capacities are expressed as logarithms in base
∣A∣.
The upper bounds established in
this section can be ported to the networking context using the Porting
Lemmas established in Section 6. The details are left to the reader.
9.1 Error-Adversaries Acting on Overlapping Sets of Coordinates
We start by considering L≥1 adversaries having access to possibly intersecting sets of
coordinates U1,...,UL⊆[s]. The adversaries have error powers
t1,...,tL≥0, and zero erasure powers.
Definition 9.1.1**.**
Let L≥1 be an integer, and let U1,...,UL⊆[s]. Let t1,...,tL
be integers with tℓ≥0 for all 1≤ℓ≤L.
Set U:=(U1,...,UL) and t:=(t1,...,tL). The channel
Ht⟨U⟩:As⇢As is defined by
[TABLE]
where Htp(i)⟨Up(i)⟩:=Htp(i),0⟨Up(i)⟩:As⇢As⊆A^s for all i∈[s]. See Definition 4.1.3 for details.
Before proceeding with the analysis of channels of type
Ht⟨U⟩,
we observe that the order in which the adversaries act is in fact irrelevant.
Lemma 9.1.2**.**
Let U1,U2⊆[s] be sets, and let t1,t2≥0 be integers. Then
[TABLE]
Proof.
To simplify the notation, we set H1:=Ht1⟨U1⟩ and
H2:=Ht2⟨U2⟩. We need to show that
for all x∈As we have (H1\RHDH2)(x)=(H2\RHDH1)(x).
By symmetry, it suffices to show that for all x∈As we have (H1\RHDH2)(x)⊆(H2\RHDH1)(x). To see this, fix an arbitrary y∈(H1\RHDH2)(x). Then by definition of concatenation there exists z∈As such that z∈H1(x) and y∈H2(z).
Define the sets U1:={1≤i≤s:zi=xi}⊆U1 and
U2:={1≤i≤s:zi=yi}⊆U2. Now construct z′∈As
as follows:
[TABLE]
One can directly check that z′∈H2(x) and y∈H1(z′). Therefore
y∈(H2\RHDH1)(x). Since y was arbitrary, this shows that
(H1\RHDH2)(x)⊆(H2\RHDH1)(x) for all x∈As,
and concludes the proof.
∎
Proposition 9.1.3**.**
Let L≥1, U=(U1,...,UL) and t=(t1,...,tL) be as in Definition 9.1.1. Then
The compound zero-error capacity of a channel of type Ht⟨U⟩ is defined as follows.
Definition 9.1.4**.**
Let L≥1, U:=(U1,...,UL) and t:=(t1,...,tL)
be as in Definition 9.1.1.
For n≥1, the compound channelHt⟨U⟩n,cp:(As)n⇢(As)n is defined by
[TABLE]
and the
compound zero-error capacity of the channel
Ht⟨U⟩ is the number
[TABLE]
We can now state the analogue of Theorem 4.3.1 for the case
of error-adversaries acting on possibly overlapping sets of coordinates.
Theorem 9.1.5**.**
Let L≥1, U:=(U1,...,UL) and t:=(t1,...,tL)
be as in Definition 9.1.1.
For all n≥1 we have
[TABLE]
where
[TABLE]
is a parameter which we call the adversarial strength.
In particular,
[TABLE]
Moreover, all the above
inequalities are achieved with equality if A=Fq and q is sufficiently large.
To prove Theorem 9.1.5,
we will need the following preliminary lemma.
Lemma 9.1**.**
Let L≥1, U:=(U1,...,UL) and t:=(t1,...,tL)
be as in Definition 9.1.1.
Fix any sets
Uℓ1,Uℓ2,⊆Uℓ, for
1≤ℓ≤L, that achieve the maximum in the definition of
the adversarial strength σt⟨U⟩ (see Theorem 9.1.5).
Let
[TABLE]
and define V:=(U11,...,UL1)⊆U,
V′=(U12,...,UL2)⊆U.
Then for any x,x′∈As we have
Ht⟨V⟩(x)∩Ht⟨V′⟩(x′)=∅
whenever xi=xi′ for all i∈[s]∖U.
Proof.
To simplify the notation, let Vℓ:=Uℓ1 and Vℓ′:=Uℓ2
for all ℓ∈{1,...,L}. Let x,x′∈As with
xi=xi′ for all i∈[s]∖U.
We will explicitly construct a vector z∈Ht⟨V⟩(x)∩Ht⟨V′⟩(x′). First of all,
define the sets
[TABLE]
Note that, by construction, W⊇U.
Therefore xi=xi′ for all i∈[s]∖W.
To construct z, recursively define vectors
z[0],...,z[L]∈As and z′[0],...,z′[L]∈As
as follows. Set z[0]:=x and z′[0]:=x′.
Then for all 1≤ℓ≤L define
[TABLE]
By construction, for all 1≤ℓ≤L we have
[TABLE]
By definition of Ht⟨V⟩ and
Ht⟨V′⟩
we have z[L]∈Ht⟨V⟩(x)
and z′[L]∈Ht⟨V′⟩(x′).
However, it is easy to see that z[L]=z′[L]. Therefore
we can take z:=z[L]=z′[L].
∎
The fact that n⋅C1(Ht⟨U⟩)≤C1(Ht⟨U⟩n)≤C1(Ht⟨U⟩n,cp) can be easily shown.
We only establish
the theorem for σ:=σu⟨U⟩<s.
The case σ=s is similar.
It suffices to show that C1(Ht⟨U⟩n,cp)≤n(s−σ) for all n≥1, and that for
A=Fq and sufficiently large q we have C1(Ht⟨U⟩)≥s−σ.
We let
Uℓ1, Uℓ2
(for 1≤ℓ≤L) and U be as in Lemma
9.1.
Note that, in particular,
σ=∣U∣. In the sequel we denote by π:As→As−σ the projection on the coordinates outside U.
Let n≥1 be an integer. Then π extends component-wise to a map
Π:(As)n→(As−σ)n. Let C⊆(As)n
be a capacity-achieving good code for Ht⟨U⟩n,cp.
To obtain the upper bound, it suffices to show that
the restriction of Π to C is injective.
Take x,x′∈C, and assume
Π(x)=Π(x′). We will show that x=x′. Write x=(x1,...,xn) and x′=(x′1,...,x′n).
By definition of Π, we have π(xk)=π(x′k) for all 1≤k≤n.
By Lemma 9.1, the
L-tuples
V:=(U11,...,UL1)⊆U and
V′:=(U12,...,UL2)⊆U
satisfy:
[TABLE]
By definition of Ht⟨U⟩n,cp we have
[TABLE]
where the last inequality follows from (27).
Since C is good for Ht⟨U⟩n,cp,
we conclude x=x′. This shows that the restriction of Π to C is injective, as desired.
We now prove that the upper bounds in the theorem are tight for A=Fq and q sufficiently large.
As already stated, it suffices to show that C1(Ht⟨U⟩)≥s−σ.
Let C⊆Fqs be code
with cardinality qs−σ and minimum distance dH(C)=σ+1.
We will show that C is good for
Ht⟨U⟩. Let x,x′∈C be arbitrary with x=x′.
Assume by contradiction that there exists
z∈Ht⟨U⟩(x)∩Ht⟨U⟩(x′).
Then by definition of Ht⟨U⟩ and Proposition 9.1.3 there
exist vectors z[0],z[1],...,z[L]∈As and z′[0],z′[1],...,z′[L]∈As
with the following properties: z[0]=x, z′[0]=x′, z[L]=z′[L]=z,
[TABLE]
Now for 1≤ℓ≤L define the sets
[TABLE]
By the construction of the
Uℓj’s and the definition of
σu⟨U⟩, we have
[TABLE]
On the other hand,
[TABLE]
Therefore the vectors z, x and x′ must agree in at least s−σ components. In particular, we have
dH(x,x′)≤σ, a contradiction.
∎
Theorem 9.1.5 can be ported to the network context to study
the scenario where multiple adversaries have access to possibly overlapping sets of network edges,
and can corrupt up to a certain number of them.
9.2 Rank-Metric Adversaries
In this section we let A:=Fqm, and study adversarial channels whose input and output alphabet is the matrix
space As≅Fqm×s, where m and s are positive integers. In the sequel, we denote by
M1,...,Ms the columns of a matrix M∈Fqm×s.
We consider an adversary who can access only some of the columns of a matrix M∈Fqm×s, and is able
to change M
in any matrix N∈Fqm×s such that \mboxrk(N−M)≤t, where t≥0 is an integer
measuring the adversary’s power.
Definition 9.2.1**.**
Let m,s≥1 and t≥0 be integers, and let U⊆[s]
be a subset. The matrix channelRt⟨U⟩:Fqm×s⇢Fqm×s is defined,
for all M∈Fqm×s, by
[TABLE]
The one-shot capacity and zero-error capacity of a rank-metric channel
Rt⟨U⟩) are as follows.
Theorem 9.2.2**.**
Let m,s≥1 and t≥0 be integers, and let U⊆[s].
For all n≥1 we have
[TABLE]
In particular,
[TABLE]
Moreover, all the above
inequalities are achieved with equality, provided that q≥m≥s.
Define σ:=min{2t,∣U∣}. By Proposition 2.4.4, it suffices to show that C1(Rt⟨U⟩n)≤n(s−σ) for all n≥1, and that
for q≥m≥s we have C1(Rt⟨U⟩)≥s−σ.
We only prove the theorem for σ<s. The case σ=s is similar.
Fix sets U1,U2⊆U with ∣U1∣,∣U2∣≤t and
∣U1∪U2∣=min{2t,∣U∣}=σ. Let U:=U1∪U2.
Denote by π:Fqm×s→Fqm×(s−σ) the projection on the columns
indexed by [s]∖U, and extend π component-wise to a projection map
[TABLE]
Reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 9.1.5, one can show that the restriction of
Π to any good code C⊆Fqm×ns for
Rt⟨U⟩n is injective. This shows the desired upper bound on
C1(Rt⟨U⟩n).
Now assume q≥m≥s. If 2t≥∣U∣, then we trivially have
C1(Rt⟨U⟩)≥s−σ.
If 2t<∣U∣, then let C⊆Fqm×s be a rank-metric code
in matrix representation [35, 36]
of minimum rank distance 2t+1 and cardinality ∣C∣=qm(s−2t)=qm(s−σ).
It is easy to see that C is good for Rt⟨U⟩.
∎
Theorem 9.2.2 can now be ported to the network context to study
the scenario where an adversary has access to the packets on a given subset U⊆E of edges,
and can corrupt them by reducing by at most t the rank of the m×∣U∣ matrix whose columns are the
packets.
10 Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed a combinatorial framework for adversarial
network coding. We have derived upper bounds for three notions of
capacity region (by porting results for Hamming-type channels to the
networking context in a systematic way) and have given some
capacity-achieving coding schemes.
The results of this paper determine (for sufficiently large network
alphabets) the three capacity regions of the following multi-source
network adversarial models:
•
error-free networks,
•
a single error-adversary with access to all the network edges,
•
a single adversary who can corrupt/erase a fraction of the
components of any alphabet symbol.
In the three models above, any integer point in the capacity regions can
be achieved using linear network coding, possibly combined with
link-level encoding/decoding. Moreover, in compound adversarial
models the use of a large network alphabet (whose size grows in general
exponentially with the number of sources) can be avoided by using the
network multiple times.
Even small modifications of these models (such as restricting the
adversary to a subset of edges) give rise to capacity regions whose
integer points cannot be achieved in general with linear network coding.
In this paper, we have derived cut-set upper bounds for the three
capacity regions associated with multiple (possibly coordinated) adversaries, who
can only operate
on prescribed subsets of the network edges. The problem of determining the various
capacity regions in this generalized adversarial models remains open.
For 1≤k≤n and 1≤i≤m, we denote by Xk,i and Yk,i the input and output alphabets, respectively, of channel Ωk,i.
By assumption, we have Yk,i⊆Xk,i+1 for all 1≤k≤n and for all
1≤i≤m−1. We need to prove that for all
(x1,1,...,xn,1)∈X1,1×⋯×Xn,1 one has
[TABLE]
We will only show the inclusion ⊆. The other containment can be seen similarly.
Fix an arbitrary
[TABLE]
By definition of product, for all 1≤k≤n we have
yk,m∈(Ωk,1\RHD⋯\RHDΩk,m)(xk,1). Thus, by definition of concatenation, for any integer 1≤k≤n there exist elements xk,2,...,xk,m with the following properties:
[TABLE]
Therefore we have (x1,i,...,xn,i)∈(Ω1,i−1×⋯×Ωn,i−1)(x1,i−1,...,xn,i−1) for all
2≤i≤m, and (y1,m,...,yn,m)∈(Ω1,m×Ωn,m)(x1,m,...,xn,m).
This implies
Denote by Xj and Yj the input (resp., output) alphabets of
channel Ωj, for j∈{1,2}.
By definition of adversarial channel, we need to show that
for all x1∈X1 we have
[TABLE]
Let us show the inclusion ⊆. Take an arbitrary y2∈(⋃i∈I(Ω1\RHDΩi\RHDΩ2))(x1). Then there exist
ι∈I, y1∈Y1⊆X and
y∈Y such that: y1∈Ω1(x1), y∈Ωι(y1), and y2∈Ω2(y).
Therefore y2∈(Ω1\RHD(⋃i∈IΩi)\RHDΩ2)(x1), as desired. The other inclusion
can be shown similarly.
∎
Part 1 is straightforward, and part 2 follows
from the fact that the Uℓ’s are pairwise disjoint. Let us show
part 3.
For all
1≤ℓ≤L define the sets Vℓ,Vℓ′⊆Uℓ by
[TABLE]
We claim that V:=(V1,...,VL) and V′:=(V1′,...,VL′) have the desired properties.
First of all, ∣V∣,∣V′∣≤t+e by construction. Now let x,x′∈As,
and assume xi=xi′ for all i∈[s]∖U. We will explicitly construct a vector
z∈Ht,e⟨V⟩(x)∩Ht,e⟨V′⟩(x′).
Define the auxiliary sets
[TABLE]
The previous unions are disjoint unions. Moreover, by construction, we have V⊇U⋆ and V′⊇U⋆.
Define z∈As as follows:
[TABLE]
Note that the vector z is well defined. Indeed, we have
xi=xi′ for all i∈/V∪V′, as
V∪V′⊇U.
One can directly check that z∈Ht,e⟨V⟩(x)∩Ht,e⟨V′⟩(x′).
∎
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