When to Invest in Security? Empirical Evidence and a Game-Theoretic Approach for Time-Based Security

TL;DR

This paper introduces a game-theoretic model for time-based security, analyzing optimal defense timing considering protection, detection, and reaction times, supported by empirical data and theoretical analysis.

Contribution

It develops a novel game-theoretic framework for time-based security, integrating empirical timing data and providing strategies for optimal defense resets.

Findings

Derived timing distributions from security incident data.

Identified the insufficiency of current timing data collection.

Proposed optimal reset strategies based on the model.

Abstract

Games of timing aim to determine the optimal defense against a strategic attacker who has the technical capability to breach a system in a stealthy fashion. Key questions arising are when the attack takes place, and when a defensive move should be initiated to reset the system resource to a known safe state. In our work, we study a more complex scenario called Time-Based Security in which we combine three main notions: protection time, detection time, and reaction time. Protection time represents the amount of time the attacker needs to execute the attack successfully. In other words, protection time represents the inherent resilience of the system against an attack. Detection time is the required time for the defender to detect that the system is compromised. Reaction time is the required time for the defender to reset the defense mechanisms in order to recreate a safe system state. In the first part of the paper, we study the VERIS Community Database (VCDB) and screen other data sources to provide insights into the actual timing of security incidents and responses. While we are able to derive distributions for some of the factors regarding the timing of security breaches, we assess the state-of-the-art regarding the collection of timing-related data as insufficient. In the second part of the paper, we propose a two-player game which captures the outlined Time-Based Security scenario in which both players move according to a periodic strategy. We carefully develop the resulting payoff functions, and provide theorems and numerical results to help the defender to calculate the best time to reset the defense mechanism by considering protection time, detection time, and reaction time.