# On Stackelberg Mixed Strategies

## TL;DR

This paper discusses the value of studying Stackelberg mixed strategies independently, despite their equivalence to subgame perfect Nash equilibria in extensive-form games, highlighting implications for other solution concepts.

## Contribution

It argues for the importance of analyzing Stackelberg mixed strategies separately, even when they are equivalent to other solution concepts, to gain deeper insights.

## Key findings

- Stackelberg mixed strategies can be viewed as subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
- Studying Stackelberg strategies separately offers unique insights.
- Implications extend to other solution concepts in game theory.

## Abstract

It is sometimes the case that one solution concept in game theory is equivalent to applying another solution concept to a modified version of the game. In such cases, does it make sense to study the former separately (as it applies to the original representation of the game), or should we entirely subordinate it to the latter? The answer probably depends on the particular circumstances, and indeed the literature takes different approaches in different cases. In this article, I consider the specific example of Stackelberg mixed strategies. I argue that, even though a Stackelberg mixed strategy can also be seen as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a corresponding extensive-form game, there remains significant value in studying it separately. The analysis of this special case may have implications for other solution concepts.