The Ties that Bind Networks: Weak Ties Facilitate the Emergence of Collective Memories
Ida Momennejad, Ajua Duker, Alin Coman

TL;DR
This study demonstrates that early interactions through weak ties in social networks promote collective memory formation, reducing polarization and enhancing shared understanding across communities.
Contribution
It reveals the crucial role of weak ties in early communication for fostering collective memories and provides a data-calibrated model to optimize information sharing in networks.
Findings
Weak ties facilitate higher mnemonic convergence when used early.
Early bridging interactions increase information diversity and shared memories.
Model extensions predict network interventions to reduce polarization.
Abstract
From families to nations, what binds individuals in social groups is the degree to which they share beliefs, norms, and memories. While local clusters of communicating individuals can sustain shared memories and norms, communities characterized by isolated cliques are susceptible to information fragmentation and polarization dynamics. We employ experimental manipulations in lab-created communities to investigate how the temporal dynamics of conversational interactions can shape the formation of collective memories. We show that when individuals that bridge cliques (i.e., weak ties) communicate early on in a series of networked interactions, the community reaches higher mnemonic convergence compared to when individuals first interact within cliques (i.e., strong ties). This, we find, is due to the tradeoffs between information diversity and accumulated overlap over time. By using data…
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Taxonomy
TopicsOpinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Complex Network Analysis Techniques · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
