# A phenomenological analysis of eco-evolutionary coupling under dilution

## TL;DR

This paper presents a phenomenological eco-evolutionary model incorporating dilution and Allee effects to analyze microbial cooperation and cheating dynamics, successfully matching experimental phase diagrams.

## Contribution

It extends existing eco-evolutionary models by including dilution and Allee effects, providing a better fit to experimental data without assuming assortative encounters.

## Key findings

- Model accurately reproduces experimental phase diagrams
- Incorporating dilution and Allee effects improves predictive power
- Model explains coexistence of cooperators and cheaters

## Abstract

Evolutionary dynamics experienced by mixed microbial populations of cooperators and cheaters has been examined in experiments in the literature using a protocol of periodic dilution to investigate the properties of resilience and adaptability to environmental changes. Data depicted on an appropriate phase diagram indicate, among other features, a stable equilibrium point at which cooperators and cheaters coexist [A. Sanchez, J. Gore, PLOs Biology, 11 (4), e1001547 (2013)]. We present here a phenomenological analysis of these data focusing on an eco-evolutionary-game perspective. To that end, we work on an extension of the model proposed by Tao and Cressman Y. Tao, R. Cressman, Bull. Math. Biol. 69, 1377 - 1399 (2007). It's original version takes into account changes of the total population density while the individuals experience pairwise Prisoner's Dilemma game. The extension devised here contains a dilution factor to be conform with the experimental procedure, in addition of a term accounting for Allee effects. Differently from other descriptions proposed in similar contexts, however, the model here does not account for assortative encounters, group or kin selection. Nonetheless, it describes surprisingly well both qualitatively and quantitatively the features of the observed phase diagram. We discuss these results in terms of the behavior of an effective payoff matrix defined accordingly.