Network Inspection for Detecting Strategic Attacks

TL;DR

This paper develops a game-theoretic approach to optimize network inspection strategies for detecting multiple strategic attacks efficiently, using minimal detectors while ensuring high detection rates.

Contribution

It formulates a large-scale bilevel optimization problem for network inspection, linking it to zero-sum game equilibria, and proposes a scalable solution using set cover and set packing techniques.

Findings

High detection performance achieved with few detectors

Scalable approach demonstrated on water network benchmarks

Method outperforms existing security game solutions

Abstract

This article studies a problem of strategic network inspection, in which a defender (agency) is tasked with detecting the presence of multiple attacks in the network. An inspection strategy entails monitoring the network components, possibly in a randomized manner, using a given number of detectors. We formulate the network inspection problem $(\mathcal{P})$ as a large-scale bilevel optimization problem, in which the defender seeks to determine an inspection strategy with minimum number of detectors that ensures a target expected detection rate under worst-case attacks. We show that optimal solutions of $(\mathcal{P})$ can be obtained from the equilibria of a large-scale zero-sum game. Our equilibrium analysis involves both game-theoretic and combinatorial arguments, and leads to a computationally tractable approach to solve $(\mathcal{P})$. Firstly, we construct an approximate solution by utilizing solutions of minimum set cover (MSC) and maximum set packing (MSP) problems, and evaluate its detection performance. In fact, this construction generalizes some of the known results in network security games. Secondly, we leverage properties of the optimal detection rate to iteratively refine our MSC/MSP-based solution through a column generation procedure. Computational results on benchmark water networks demonstrate the scalability, performance, and operational feasibility of our approach. The results indicate that utilities can achieve a high level of protection in large-scale networks by strategically positioning a small number of detectors.

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