# Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Digital Signatures

## TL;DR

This paper introduces a measurement-device-independent quantum digital signature scheme that enhances security against detector side-channel attacks, leveraging principles from MDI-QKD for practical implementation.

## Contribution

The paper proposes the first MDI-QDS protocol that is secure against all detector side-channel attacks, inspired by recent advances in MDI-QKD.

## Key findings

- Protocol is theoretically secure against side-channel attacks.
- Compatible with existing MDI-QKD experimental setups.
- Potential for practical implementation in secure communications.

## Abstract

Digital signatures play an important role in software distribution, modern communication and financial transactions, where it is important to detect forgery and tampering. Signatures are a cryptographic technique for validating the authenticity and integrity of messages, software, or digital documents. The security of currently used classical schemes relies on computational assumptions. Quantum digital signatures (QDS), on the other hand, provide information-theoretic security based on the laws of quantum physics. Recent work on QDS shows that such schemes do not require trusted quantum channels and are unconditionally secure against general coherent attacks. However, in practical QDS, just as in quantum key distribution (QKD), the detectors can be subjected to side-channel attacks, which can make the actual implementations insecure. Motivated by the idea of measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD), we present a measurement-device-independent QDS (MDI-QDS) scheme, which is secure against all detector side-channel attacks. Based on the rapid development of practical MDI-QKD, our MDI-QDS protocol could also be experimentally implemented, since it requires a similar experimental setup.