Can MPTCP Secure Internet Communications from Man-in-the-Middle Attacks?

TL;DR

This paper investigates whether MPTCP can enhance security against man-in-the-middle attacks by analyzing AS-level graph robustness across countries and regions, considering factors like route hijacking and cable tapping.

Contribution

It provides a novel analysis of MPTCP's potential to improve security by examining AS-level network structures and regional vulnerabilities.

Findings

Certain countries show higher robustness against MITM attacks.

AS-level analysis reveals regional differences in network security.

MPTCP's multipath nature may reduce MITM attack success probability.

Abstract

-Multipath communications at the Internet scale have been a myth for a long time, with no actual protocol being deployed so that multiple paths could be taken by a same connection on the way towards an Internet destination. Recently, the Multipath Transport Control Protocol (MPTCP) extension was standardized and is undergoing a quick adoption in many use-cases, from mobile to fixed access networks, from data-centers to core networks. Among its major benefits -- i.e., reliability thanks to backup path rerouting; throughput increase thanks to link aggregation; and confidentiality thanks to harder capacity to intercept a full connection -- the latter has attracted lower attention. How interesting would it be using MPTCP to exploit multiple Internet-scale paths hence decreasing the probability of man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks is a question to which we try to answer. By analyzing the Autonomous System (AS) level graph, we identify which countries and regions show a higher level of robustness against MITM AS-level attacks, for example due to core cable tapping or route hijacking practices.