# Secure Mode Distinguishability for Switching Systems Subject to Sparse Attacks

## TL;DR

This paper establishes conditions under which the initial discrete state of a switching system can be exactly reconstructed from continuous outputs despite malicious attacks, enhancing security in cyber-physical systems.

## Contribution

It introduces new criteria for secure mode distinguishability in switching systems under sparse attacks, focusing on scenarios where discrete outputs are unavailable.

## Key findings

- Conditions for exact initial state reconstruction under attack.
- Application to a hybrid DC/DC boost converter model.
- Enhanced security guarantees for cyber-physical systems.

## Abstract

Switching systems are an important mathematical formalism when dealing with Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs). In this paper we provide conditions for the exact reconstruction of the initial discrete state of a switching system, when only the continuous output is measurable, and the discrete output signal is not available. In particular, assuming that the continuous input and output signals may be corrupted by additive malicious attacks, we provide conditions for the secure mode distinguishability for linear switching systems. As illustrative example, we consider the hybrid model of a DC/DC boost converter.