Committees providing EJR can be computed efficiently
Luis S\'anchez-Fern\'andez, Edith Elkind, Martin Lackner

TL;DR
This paper introduces a family of approval-based multi-winner voting rules satisfying proportional justified representation, including a polynomial-time computable subfamily that guarantees extended justified representation, with one rule computable in $O(n m k)$ time.
Contribution
It identifies a family of PJR-satisfying voting rules, including a polynomial-time subfamily that guarantees EJR, advancing computational efficiency in approval voting.
Findings
Family of approval-based voting rules satisfying PJR
Subfamily satisfying EJR can be computed in polynomial time
One rule computed in $O(n m k)$ time
Abstract
We identify a whole family of approval-based multi-winner voting rules that satisfy PJR. Moreover, we identify a subfamily of voting rules within this family that satisfy EJR. All these voting rules can be computed in polynomial time as long as the subalgorithms that characterize each rule within the family are polynomial. One of the voting rules that satisfy EJR can be computed in .
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Auction Theory and Applications · Complexity and Algorithms in Graphs
