# Networked Systems under Denial-of-Service: Co-located vs. Remote Control Architectures

## TL;DR

This paper compares the robustness of co-located and remote control architectures in networked systems under DoS attacks, analyzing stability and robustness gaps to inform design choices.

## Contribution

It introduces a remote control architecture that approximates co-location, analyzing its stability and robustness relative to traditional co-located systems.

## Key findings

- Remote architecture closely approximates co-located robustness.
- Quantifies the stability gap between architectures.
- Provides insights for flexible, cost-effective control system design.

## Abstract

In this paper, we study networked systems in the presence of Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, namely attacks that prevent transmissions over the communication network. Previous studies have shown that co-located architectures (control unit co-located with the actuators and networked sensor channel) can ensure a high level of robustness against DoS. However, co-location requires a wired or dedicated actuator channel, which could not meet flexibility and cost requirements. In this paper we consider a control architecture that approximates co-location while enabling remote implementation (networked sensor and actuator channels). We analyze closed-loop stability and quantify the robustness "gap" between this architecture and the co-located one.