Combinatorial Auctions with Online XOS Bidders
Shaddin Dughmi, Bryan Wilder

TL;DR
This paper develops an online algorithm for welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions with XOS bidders, achieving a constant-factor approximation by reducing from offline algorithms and modeling the problem as a secretary problem variant.
Contribution
It introduces a black box reduction from offline to online welfare maximization for XOS valuations in a sequential setting, with a novel connection to secretary problems.
Findings
Achieves a 0.199-approximation for online welfare maximization.
Models the online auction as a secretary problem with nonuniform order.
Provides a framework to leverage offline algorithms for online settings.
Abstract
In combinatorial auctions, a designer must decide how to allocate a set of indivisible items amongst a set of bidders. Each bidder has a valuation function which gives the utility they obtain from any subset of the items. Our focus is specifically on welfare maximization, where the objective is to maximize the sum of valuations that the bidders place on the items that they were allocated (the valuation functions are assumed to be reported truthfully). We analyze an online problem in which the algorithm is not given the set of bidders in advance. Instead, the bidders are revealed sequentially in a uniformly random order, similarly to secretary problems. The algorithm must make an irrevocable decision about which items to allocate to the current bidder before the next one is revealed. When the valuation functions lie in the class (which includes submodular functions), we provide a…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAuction Theory and Applications · Optimization and Search Problems · Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
