Counterfactuals, indicative conditionals, and negation under uncertainty: Are there cross-cultural differences?

TL;DR

This study investigates whether cultural differences influence reasoning about counterfactuals and conditionals under uncertainty, finding similar reasoning patterns among Japanese and Western participants and supporting probabilistic coherence as a rational reasoning model.

Contribution

It provides empirical evidence that cultural background does not significantly alter reasoning about conditionals and counterfactuals, endorsing probabilistic coherence as a universal reasoning framework.

Findings

Eastern and Western participants showed similar reasoning patterns.

Conditional probability predicts responses for both conditionals and counterfactuals.

Most responses are probabilistically coherent, supporting coherence-based probability logic.

Abstract

In this paper we study selected argument forms involving counterfactuals and indicative conditionals under uncertainty. We selected argument forms to explore whether people with an Eastern cultural background reason differently about conditionals compared to Westerners, because of the differences in the location of negations. In a 2x2 between-participants design, 63 Japanese university students were allocated to four groups, crossing indicative conditionals and counterfactuals, and each presented in two random task orders. The data show close agreement between the responses of Easterners and Westerners. The modal responses provide strong support for the hypothesis that conditional probability is the best predictor for counterfactuals and indicative conditionals. Finally, the grand majority of the responses are probabilistically coherent, which endorses the psychological plausibility of choosing coherence-based probability logic as a rationality framework for psychological reasoning research.