# Stability in a many-to-one job market with general increasing functions

## TL;DR

This paper analyzes a complex occupation market with non-linear preferences, demonstrating the existence of pairwise stability in a many-to-one setting with multiple workers per firm and bounded side payments.

## Contribution

It extends the Ali and Farooq model by incorporating non-linear valuations and bounded side payments, establishing stability results in this more general framework.

## Key findings

- Existence of pairwise stability in the model
- Extension of previous models to non-linear preferences
- Inclusion of bounded side payments in the analysis

## Abstract

We consider an occupation market in which preferences of members are treated as non linear general increasing functions. The arrangement of members is separated into two non over-lapping sets, set of workers and set of firms. We consider that firms have vacant posts. Every worker needs a job and firms have opportunity to contract more than one workers. A worker can work for just in at most one firm. We demonstrate the existence of pairwise stability for such a business sector. Our model is the augmentation of the Ali and Farooq [3] model by considering non linear valuations and bounded side payments.